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The cattle market in Chile is constituted by cattle slaughtering firms and farmers; 
the industry demands cattle but also demands beef imports. Based in antecedents of 
market concentration in this sector, I make a system of equations model based on the 
NEIO approach to determine market power for the period April 1993 - December 2008. 
The results show that there is no market power in the aggregated market as well as in the 
disaggregated market by sex and age type, which is explained because the special 






CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Preface 
In the last decade there has been a trend toward concentration in the sectors of food 
manufacturing and retailing, most frequently in developed countries (Sexton et al., 2007). 
However, this situation also has been seen in developing and poor countries 
(Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008). This concentration in the productive chains operates 
in two ways: horizontal (the number of firms on a certain level of the chain tends to 
decrease) or vertical (a single or a few firms have control over more points of a production 
chain) (Murphy, 2006). Both kinds of concentration change the structure of the market 
and could generate market power, which is defined as the ability of certain firm or group 
of firms to change the price above or below the competitive price of selling or buying, 
respectively (Perloff, 2011). This situation generates gains for the industrial and retail 
sector, but it can be harmful to farmers and consumers (Whithley, 2003). The farmers, 
especially the small ones, are affected by the market power from the buyer (monopsony 
or oligopsony), which often decreases the farmers income, potentially causing a loss of 





The meat sector, which is mainly compose of cattle, hogs and poultry; has been the 
object of several studies related to market power, especially in the U.S. This is mainly 
because the U.S. has shown high levels of industrialization and concentration in the last 
decades (Ward, 2001). 
The focus of my research will be on Chile, because the agriculture sector in Chile is 
highly industrialized and there is evidence of market power in some markets: sugar 
(Marchant, 2004), pork (Marchant, 2006), milk (Barrientos et al., 2006), and corn (Pavez, 
2007). Also, there is evidence that indicates that there could be oligopsony power in the 
Chilean cattle market, with similar characteristics to the U.S. market: high concentration 
and industrialization. In the last decades (Vargas and Foster, 2000); cattle farms have 
decreased in number, but have increased in size (Chile, 2008). All these elements have 
slowly and constantly weakened the cattle market, with tendencies to decrease the total 
number of cattle, decrease the prices paid to farmers, increase the sacrifice of females, 
and an increase of the imports of beef (Chile, 2009). The smaller cattle farmers are the 
most harmed group and if this tendency continues they will decrease more in number 
and become poorer.  
The problem is that the beef industry in Chile is becoming more concentrated, 
creating potential for a few firms to gain market power, which could be used to pay a 
lower price to cattle farmers. Thus, the farmers’ income decreases, making the farmers 







The goal of this work is to find, based on the available information and selected 
techniques, if there is any evidence of Market Power from the transformation industry 
(slaughterhouses) in the Chilean cattle market. 
The method selected to measure market power is the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) because allows to evaluate industry structural changes and market 
power in time. So being more dynamic than the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
approach. Additionally NEIO approach fits better with the data available for Chilean Cattle 
Market 
The hypothesis to be tested is that the parameter to measure market power will be 
different from zero, against the null hypothesis that this parameter will be equal to zero. 
This hypothesis will be tested thanks to a system of equations of inverse demand of cattle 
from the industry and supply of cattle from the farmers. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists in 4 additional chapters: Literature Reviews, in which I want to 
show the available literature to make a context about market power, market power in 
agriculture, the Chilean Cattle Market, and the ways available to measure Market Power. 
Data, where I describe the available data, in order to make the models. Model Estimation, 
where I show the derivation of the model, then the results. And finally, conclusions, where 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Market Power 
According to Murphy (2006) and Perloff (2011) market power is the ability of certain 
firm or group of firms to change the price above or below the competitive price of selling 
or buying respectively. 
Market power could be measured in many ways: Two of the most common 
measures are: the Concentration Ratio (CR), which measures how much of the market is 
controlled by the largest firms; and the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index, which is 
computed as the sum of the of the market share of each firm in the industry (Murphy, 
2006).  
2.1.1 Market Power from the Buyer 
On the demand-side monopsony (one buyer) and oligopsony (few buyers) 
describes the situations of concentrated market power, who threats the competition and 
affects sellers with a less optimal situation than in perfect competition (Rogers and 
Sexton, 1994; Murphy, 2006; Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008), and also has a dead 
weight loss to society (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008; Tribl, 2009), this situation 
happens, according to Cartensen (2004) because with the increase in the purchased 




Rogers and Sexton (1994) argue the importance of oligopsony power in producer 
markets; furthermore, for understand this issue is required the use of models, which must 
have: Products, which often are perishable and large amounts, so with high 
transportation costs that at the end limits the selling options. Processors (buyers), with 
demand over a specific good, which have not substitutes. Farmers who produce particular 
goods and because of that they have high level of investments in their farms. And finally, 
institutions with seller power, like bargaining association could be present. The model 
also considers a concentrated market structure, costly product transportation, and 
potential non-competitive conduct among processor/handlers. 
 
2.1.2 Harm of Market Power to Agriculture 
Whitley (2003) examines the gains and losses of concentration in agriculture, 
where if any part of the chain is getting concentrated their market power will be 
increased, however, the problem is when only one of the parts of this chain is getting 
concentrated, and the others do not.    
In agriculture, three groups are harmed by market power: farmers, farm workers 
and consumers (Murphy, 2006).  
The farmers, especially the smaller ones from developing countries, are being 
affected for the modernization and concentration of the food industry, which generates 
a buyer's market power. Furthermore, this type of farmer lacks on organization, so their 




them harder to give a constant supply to the industry or retail (Murphy, 2006, Rogers and 
Sexton, 1994).   
Farm workers are increasing in the world, because many poor farmers are losing 
their land, so they switch work to bigger farms, sometimes working in unfavorable 
conditions, this more frequent for  immigrants or subcontracted workers. Farm workers 
receive lower wage than other sectors, like industry. Also the pressure from the industry 
and retail to keep low costs, makes to decrease wages. All this is complemented with their 
lack in organization and education (Murphy, 2006).  
Finally, the third group affected by the market power in agriculture corresponds 
to consumers, because mostly the developed countries are concentrating market power 
over commodities and food retail trade, so the price of the food is increasing. In 
developing countries most poor farmers are poor consumers, so they are affected by low 
selling prices and high buying food prices. Moreover international trade does not ensure 
low prices, because most of the times the delivery of the food is in hands of retailers that 
increase the prices (Murphy, 2006; Sexton and Zhang, 2000). 
 
2.1.3 Evidence of Market Power in Agriculture 
Murphy (2006) compares the market power structure in agriculture with the 
hourglass shape: in both extremes, a very large amount of farmers, who sell their raw 
products, and consumers, who buy the processed products, and in the middle a small 
number of processors and distributors, who buy the product from farmers, make some 




analyze different cases (Rogers and Sexton, 1994; Sexton and Zhang, 2000; Sexton et al 
2003; Carstensen, 2004; Crespi et al. 2012). Table 2.1 shows more research work about 
buyer’s market power in agriculture; from this table, we can see that at least half of the 
articles talk about meat industry (cattle, hogs, poultry) and most of them are goods that 
require industrialized operations (meat, tomato sauce, orange juice, wood, tea, tobacco, 
fish, cocoa, vanilla, diary, etc.). Moreover, most of them occur in developed countries 
(U.S. and Europe), Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi (2008) said that maybe is because the 

















Table 2.1. Examples of Studies about Market Power in the Agricultural-Food Sector 
Sector/Country Market Power Type Market Power Presence Article 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony and oligopoly Yes Azzam and Pagoulatos, 1990 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Azzam, 1997 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Koontz and García, 1997 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony No Muth and Wohlgenant, 1999 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Hunnicutt, Crook and Bailey 2001 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Chung and Tostao, 2008 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Cai, Stiegert, Koontz, 2009 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Crespi, Xia and Jones, 2010 
Beef / U.S. Oligopsony and oligopoly Yes Ji, 2011 
Hogs / U.S. Oligopsony No Sperling. 2002. 
Hogs / German and 
Hungarian Oligopsony Yes Bakucs et al., 2009 
Hogs / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Zheng and Vukina, 2009 
Hogs / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Wise and Trist, 2010. 
Beef and Hogs / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Koontz, 2003 
Beef and Hogs / Canada Oligopsony Yes beef, no  hogs Quagrainie et al., 2003 
Beef and hogs / Germany Oligopsony and oligopoly Yes Weber and Anders, 2007 
Beef and hogs / Germany Oligopsony and oligopoly Yes Anders, 2008 
Meat (bovine, hogs, lamb) / 
U.S. Oligopsony Yes Ward, 2001 
Broiler / U.S. Monopsony Yes Vukina and Leegomonchai. 2006. 
Broilers / U.S. Monopsony Yes Key and MacDonald, 2008 
Broilers / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Liang et al., 2010 
Catfish / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Wiese, 2004 
Catfish / U.S. Oligopsony No Bouras and Engle, 2007 





Table 2.1 Continued 
Tomato / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Just and Chern, 1980 
Tomato / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Durham, 1991 
Tomato / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Durham and Sexton, 1992 
Potatoes / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Richards, Patterson and Acharya. 2001 
Potatoes / U.S. Oligopsony and oligopoly Yes 
Katchova, Sheldon and 
Miranda, 2005 
Cocoa Bean / Ivory Coast Oligopsony Yes Wilcox and Abbott, 2004 
Tea / India and Kenya Oligopsony and oligopoly Yes Weerahewa, 2003 
Tobacco / U.S. Monopsony Yes Raper, Love and Shumway, 2000 
Cigarette / Europe Oligopsony Yes Delipalla and O`Donell, 2001 
Vanilla Beans /from U.S. 
Importers Oligopsony Yes 
Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri, 
2001 
Wood / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Murray, 1995 
Wheat / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Russo, 2007 
Rice / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Crespi, Gao, Hanawa, 2005 
Corn / U.S. Oligopsony and oligopoly Yes 
Saitone, Sexton and Sexton, 
2008 
Oranges / U.S. Oligopsony Yes Guci and Brown, 2007 
Diary, meat and other foods 
/ France 
Oligopsony and 
Oligopoly Yes Gohin and Guyomard, 2000 
Milk / Spain Oligopsony Yes Alvarez et al., 2000 
Milk / Turkey Oligopsony and oligopoly Yes Hatirli et al., 2006 





2.1.4 Causes of Market Power in Agriculture 
2.1.4.1 Concentration 
There is a trend to concentration in food manufacturing and retailing sectors in 
U.S. and Western Europe (Sexton, 2000; Rogers, 2001; Connor, 2003; Sexton 2004, Sexton 
et al., 2007), for example Sexton (2000, page 1087) said that in the United States the CR4 
index of some key industries have been raised a lot: “beef packing from 30% in 1978 to 
86% in 1994, malt beverages from 40% in 1967 to 90% in 1992, wheat milling from 30% 
in 1969 to 77% in 1995, pasta manufacturing from 34% in 1967 to 78% in 1992”. He also 
said that CR6 index for supermarket retail sector increase from 32% in 1992 to 50% in 
2000.  
The concentration could operate in two ways: horizontal and vertical. 
 Horizontal integration: the index of concentration for some point in a production 
chain is high, i.e. production, transformation or retail; so the few firms have market 
power, for example: commercial seed market, heavy farm machinery, and commodities 
processing (Connor, 2003; Murphy, 2006).  
Vertical integration: where one or few firms have control over more points of a 
production chain, i.e. production and transformation or transformation and retail; 
increasing their efficiency, welfare and market power; for example, the poultry and 
tobacco production in United States (Sexton, 2000; Murphy, 2006, Sexton et al. 2003; 
Gregra, 2003; Asirvatham and Bhuyan, 2004; Connor, 2003; Sexton, 2004; Sexton et al., 




generated by an expansion of exports (Sheldon, 2006). Consumers can obtain benefits 
from a vertically coordinated food markets, increasing their access to more products and 
at lower costs. On the other hand less efficient producers and intermediaries are harmed 
by this concentration (Sexton, 2000; Sperling, 2002; Sexton et al., 2007; Crespi et al. 
2012).  
2.1.4.2 Contracts 
Contracts can be used to reduce market power; however, many times the contract 
could punish the producer if they do not produce a certain amount, can make the 
producer receive less price, assume all the risk of production or make the market less 
transparent, because the price discovery disappears (Murphy, 2006; Sivramkrishna and 
Jyotishi, 2008). For example, the contract called “captive supplies” is used to decrease the 
spot price in the cattle market in the United States, in fact, there is an inverse relation 
between this kind of contract and the spot price in regions that use the contract (Zhang 
and Sexton, 2000). 
2.1.4.3 Organization 
As mentioned before, farmers have problems to organize a market power to 
obtain benefits. The causes of this could be differences in land ownership, access to 
capital, competition, etc. By the other hand the industries and retail are very well 
organized, because they are in many cases a small number with same interests, and also 




their country to others (Sexton, 2000; Sexton et al., 2007). Furthermore, they could 
generate political influence (Murphy, 2006). 
2.1.4.4 International Trade 
With the expansion of global trade, many production chains were created and also 
new rules for agricultural trade are being negotiated at the WTO in Doha Agenda, to 
eliminate export subsidies and decrease domestic support and tariffs; which is positive in 
developed countries, but could generate problems in developing countries, where 
domestic markets need these regulations (Murphy, 2006). Moreover, some of the rules 
from WTO do not allow governments to provide some regulation to avoid trade problems, 
i.e. to increase or decrease production. This situation is taken as an opportunity to 
multinational industries and retailers to get market power (they increase their vertical 
concentration and have less regulation over them) and to form cartels; for example, in 
Africa there are many cases where countries need to increase domestic production, to 
replace imports (Connor, 2003; Sexton, 2004; Murphy, 2006; Sexton et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the welfare from the new agreements not reaches the farmers or the 
exporters, in the exporter commodity country, or the consumers in the importer country, 
because the highly vertically concentrated industries from developed countries (Sexton, 
2004; Sheldon, 2006; Sexton et al., 2007).      
2.1.4.5 Geographical Isolation 
There is a relation between the geographical isolation and the incidence of market 




production to a few buyers, mainly middlemen. In fact, space modeling has become 
important to measured market power. Moreover, the problem becomes more serious if 
the product is perishable and bulk, common in agricultural goods; as well as high 
transportation costs (Rogers and Sexton, 1994; Zhang and Sexton, 2000; Susuki and 
Sexton, 2005; Tribl, 2009). 
2.1.4.6 Other Causes 
Several other issues can increase market power: increase of global commodity 
chains (Murphy, 2006); the existence of influential transnational brands, (Murphy, 2006); 
the lack of productive alternatives to farmers obligates them to depend on a single or few 
goods, reducing their bargaining power (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008); the size of the 
farm: a bigger farm is less affected by the buyer power, because by its size, have some 
seller power to bargain (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008); investment allows the increase 
in power and the differentiation with the others, i.e. most of the dominant agribusiness 
and supermarkets firms have high investment rates (Murphy, 2006); finally based on 
Sexton (2004) and Sheldon (2006) exists a relationship based between value added of 
commodities and market power, because there market power is related with the imports 
of raw products from developing countries to developed countries, but maybe if the 
products have some added value, the buyer market power could be decreased, because 





2.1.5 Ways to Avoid Negative Implications of Market Power to Farmers 
 
2.1.5.1 Form Cooperatives 
Whitley (2003) argues that there are losses from concentration, but also gains: 
lower production costs, management gains, increased levels of competition, increased 
rates of innovation, and more efficient quality signaling. So farmers (also farm workers or 
consumers) can form cooperatives in order to produce an opposite force and obtain 
benefits (Novkovic, 2008; Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008; Tribl, 2009). Moreover, Tribl 
(2009) proposes to make marketing cooperatives between the industries and the farmers' 
cooperatives. The government could have a critical role guiding them with the legal 
framework (Murphy, 2006). 
2.1.5.2 Contracts 
If a contract is regulated by the government in favor of the farmers, contract 
farming could be a powerful tool to avoid some market power distortions, for example, 
sharing the risk, ensure a fair minimum price, and enable the correct information transfer 
(Murphy, 2006; Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008). Moreover, contracts between 
government and industries could be made improving environmental protection with 
incentives or penalties (Murphy, 2006). Finally, the government must regulate contracts, 





2.1.5.3 Market Regulations 
Like I said before, the local government can act establishing regulations to 
decrease market power in the country territory, however, it must configure these 
regulations with the rest of the countries to have coherency with the trade liberalization 
and globalization (Murphy, 2006). Even though, Sheldon (2006) and Sexton (2004) say 
that with trade liberalization from developed countries (i.e. lower import tariffs), 
developing countries can take advantage and export to these countries, generating 
welfare that could reach the farmers, if the market power of the industrial sector does 
not interfere. Additionally, regulations like Antitrust Laws ensure free competition and 
decrease the market power of firms (Connor, 2003), however, might be adapted to the 
time changes to make them efficient (Sexton, 2000). Moreover, creating a firm which buys 
all farmers’ products at a fair price, and sells it to firms (Murphy, 2006). Finally, subsidies 
could work; however, the government must regulate the benefits to ensure the farmers 
get it and not the middlemen or firms that sell inputs to the farms, like the case of ethanol 
promotion presented by Saitone, Sexton and Sexton (2007).   
2.1.5.4 Improve Transportation 
Decrease transportation costs and/or improving infrastructure will help the whole 
market to increase space limits and add more buyers and sellers to the market (Susuki 





2.2 Market Power in Cattle Beef Sector 
In this thesis, I will focus on the market power in the cattle-beef sector. As shown 
in Table 2.1. there are many papers from beef sector market power, most of them from 
the U.S. finding presence of market power. This could be related with the lasts decades’ 
trend towards concentration in food manufacturing and retailing (Ward, 2001; Sexton et 
al., 2007). However, this situation also has been seen in developing countries, and the 
lack of studies are just because lack of data (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008). Like I said 
buyers’ market power generates gains for the industrial and retail sector, harming  
especially small farmers, decreasing their income, potentially causing a loss of land and 
finally decreasing their number (Whithley, 2003; Murphy, 2006).  
 
2.3 Market Power in Chilean Agriculture 
There is no literature about measuring beef market power in Chile; however, there 
are works, which find evidence of concentration in other agricultural markets. Marchant 
(2004), measures monopsony power in the sugar marketing chain obtaining a market 
power index of 39.4% from the industry to the farmers for the period 1955-2002. 
Marchant (2006), estimates monopoly power in the pork industry, for the period 1975-
2004, finding a power index of 7%. Barrientos et al. (2006), measures the level of 
concentration and market power in the market for fresh milk, finding for the period 1999-
2005, a concentration index (c-4) around 26% and estimated market power index 0.32. 
Villar (2005) also measured the oligopsony power in Chilean dairy processing industry; 




measures oligopsony power in the corn marketing chain in Chile, resulting in an exercise 
of oligopsony power in the long run equal to 4.68%, while in the short term 10.94%.  
 
2.4 The Chilean Beef Sector 
2.4.1 Cattle Production 
The cattle production in Chile has been increased to 1 million heads for the year 
2008. In the nineties and late-eighties there was a steady increase of 2.3% per year, 
however, in 1997 there was a slight decrease in the total sacrifices (INE, 2009c; Fundación 
Chile, 2000).  
From 2003-2008, steers correspond to the most sacrificed category, who 
represent more than half of the total benefit, followed by cows and heifers. The less 
sacrificed categories are oxen, bulls, and finally calves; because they are not raised 
primarily to produce meat (INE, 2009c). 
Comparing the national forestry and agricultural censuses of 1976, 1997 and 2007, 
from 1976 to 1997, there was an increase in bovine cattle of 22% reaching a total of 4.1 
million animals for 1997, then from 1997 to 2007, there was a slight fall of 7.5% 
represented by a decrease of 308,800 heads. This decline may be related to the steady 
increase in imports, the decline of small producers and growth of larger producers who 
have become dairy farmers, due to the complexity and the narrow margins of business 





2.4.2 Carcass Production 
The production of carcass beef follows the same trend of the sacrificed cattle. The 
minor changes between sacrifices and carcass beef can be explained by the amount of 
beef possessed by each category, being lower in the case of calves, heifers and cows and 
higher for bulls, steers, oxen and young bulls (Fundación Chile, 2000). 
In recent years, the sacrifices of adult bellies (cows) and new bellies (heifers) have 
been increased, to 64% and 31% respectively for 2003 to 2008. This is serious because the 
bellies are considered fixed assets, and if the producers sacrifice the bellies compromises 
the future production. Furthermore, calves, oxen, bulls and young bulls, also have 
increases in sacrifice; most for calves with an increase of 123% for the same period. Finally, 
the lowest growth in sacrifices corresponds to steers, which are considered as the main 
category to produce meat (INE, 2009c; Manterola, Personal Communication, 2010). 
 
2.4.3 Beef  Consumption 
Beef consumption had a steady increase from 14.2 kg/capita in 1986 to 25.6 
kg/capita in 1997, and coincides with the increase in production and imports (Fundación 
Chile, 2000); then in the last decade still rise, but experienced a decline from 2006 to 2008. 
This could be explained by the higher consumer prices, lower per capita income and 
imports of beef (INE, 2009c). Moreover, beef consumption now is similar to pork (23.5 kg) 






Imports have been decreased from 2006 to 2008, which may be related to the 
higher price of beef; supply problems linked with the main suppliers of beef, Argentina 
and Brazil, which have a drop in 2008 compared to 2007, because outbreaks of FMD. 
Moreover, Argentina, after its recover from the FMD problem, in 2008 imposed a tax on 
their own beef exports to avoid excessive price increases in the country, so Paraguay and 
Uruguay have supplied the lack of imports. Paraguayan beef has lower quality than 
Chilean, because the herds have zebu breeds, which are of minor quality (Amunategui, 
2008). 
During the early nineties the domestic demand for beef increased faster than the 
country's production, making necessary increasing imports, which were favored by the 
reduction of entry barriers, both commercial and sanitary (Fundación Chile, 2000; Maino 
et al., 1997). The beef imports (fresh or chilled beef without bones) are made by the 
Industrial Slaughter Plants, but also since the mid-nineties supermarkets chains 
(Monserrat, D & S, Unimarc and Jumbo) importation grew to between 17 and 23% of the 
total for 1997, reaching almost 60% by the year 2006 (Fundación Chile, 2000). Moreover, 
the imports of frozen beef by Slaughterhouses start to decrease in the nineties, because 
the involvement of net importers firms and companies associated with processed meat 






Beef exports in Chile, are relatively new and minor compared to imports. Chile 
exports to: The European Union (with the higher prices, but whose duty-free quota is 
exceeded), Mexico (with low prices), United States (without tariff since 2007), Japan and 
Cuba. Exports are not consolidated due to the very small amount of Slaughterhouses with 
export certificates, and low prices for producers. For the period 2003-2008, the exports 
has been growing steadily, however, in the years 2006 and 2007 has stabilized at a level 
less than half the peak reached in 2005 (INE, 2009; Amunátegui, 2008). 
 
2.4.6 The Chilean Beef Marketing Chain 
Figure 2.1 summarizes the Chilean beef marketing chain in the year 1998; now the 
only difference is the exports of beef. The main agents of the chain are: producers, cattle 
brokers, cattle livestock fairs, slaughterhouses, butcher shops, supermarkets and 
consumers. Additionally, importation of meat has taken a large and growing role, because 
lack of domestic supply, growing domestic demand, and the increase in trade 
agreements, i.e. Mercosur.  
There is a tendency to concentration in the industry, decreasing the activity of 
middlemen and other agents. Like we said before the cattle sell is changing, decreasing 
middlemen, cattle brokers and fairs activity, towards to direct sell to slaughterhouses and 
supermarkets. In the case of the beef sale to final consumers, the importance of 




decreased to some neighborhoods in small cities (Fundación Chile, 2000; Fundación Chile, 
2006; Sociedad de Fomento Fabril et al., 2004; ODEPA, 2007). 
The geographic location is important because most of the cattle is produced in the 
south of the country, while the slaughtering of livestock is concentrated around large 
cities, as in Santiago, Osorno, Talca and Chillán, along the center and south of Chile. In 
these cities, the relationship between the number of animals slaughtered and the total 
stock of cattle is 303% for 1997, while the average for the country is just 26%. This 
concentration could be explained because of the lower transport cost of cattle compared 
with refrigerated beef and because most of the demand is concentrated in the biggest 


























Figure 2.1. Chilean Beef Marketing Chain 
Adapted from Fundación Chile (2000). 
 
2.4.6.1 Cattle producers 
There are different kinds of producers, based on the activity (breeding, rearing, 
cattle fattening), and farm characteristics (size, cattle breed, mode and operating costs). 
By 2001, there were about 185,000 independent cattle producers and no organization 
among the producers has been successful (Oficina de Estudios y Politicas Agrarias, 2007). 
Production is based on beef, dairy and dual purpose cattle. The beef breeds only 
represent 25% of total beef cattle dedicated, and most of the meat produced in Chile is 
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from discarded dairy breed steers, so beef is not high quality. The producers, based on 
their size, have substantial differences regarding their direct costs and total production 
costs (Campos et al., 2009; ODEPA, 2007; Fundación Chile, 2006; Fundación Chile , 2005; 
Dresdner, 2004). 
The fattened up animal is sold to middlemen, such as cattle brokers, cattle fairs, 
slaughterhouses or supermarkets. Cattle brokers and fairs still remain valid, especially in 
areas of the south of Chile; however, have declined because the country’s connectivity 
have been improved, and direct sales at the farm have grown, even contract sales with 
slaughter plants and supermarket chains (ODEPA, 2007; Chavarria et al., 2001, Fundación 
Chile, 2000; Maino et al., 1998). 
The downward trend in producer prices observed since the nineties have led to a 
change of meat to milk production or mixed, incorporating Holstein breed semen to give 
the cattle some dairy breeds characteristics (Manterola, Personal Communication, 2010). 
The Chilean small cattle producers are characterized by: use of naturalized 
pastures (low input) and produce wheat and forage; farms' surfaces at or below 30 ha; 
will to improve production but knowledge about constraints like lack of high-quality  soils, 
minimal facilities and trade; poor genetic improvement, feed, productive and health 
management of the cattle; tendency to crossbreeding using beef breeds;  they agree in 
the advantages of have their own slaughterhouse; the cattle sales are in most cases made 





Slaughterhouses are one of the fundamental links since transform the living 
animal into beef carcass or beef. Higher standards for safety production imposed by the 
Chilean Beef Law 19.1621 at the beginning of the nineties (Biblioteca Congreso Nacional 
de Chile, 2009) decreased their number. From the 164 slaughtering plants recognized by 
the government only a few are to leader plants, which have scale economies and high 
technological levels. By 2000, just 12 plants were located in the Metropolitan Region; 
processing almost 46% of the national production. Furthermore, the growth in production 
continues despite a significant reduction in the total number of slaughterhouses by 2007. 
Consequently the slaughterhouses formed a relatively stable group, with experience, 
trained workers, and standards of quality and hygiene, preventing the entry of new 
competitors (Fundación Chile, 2000; Luengo, 1998; Asociación Gremial de Plantas 
Faenadoras Frigoríficas de Carnes, 2007a and 2007b).  
 Slaughterhouses have a preference for large animals, over 500 Kg, instead of 
medium, from 250 to 300 kg range, because is faster to operate a large animal than two 
animals of lower weight. The problem is that a larger animal is often not best suited to 
produce for many livestock producers, especially extensive systems, since it implies 
higher costs (SAG, 2005; ODEPA 2007; Fundación Chile, 2000). 
1 Establishes a Mandatory Cattle Classification System, Classification and Nomenclature of the beef and Regulates the functioning of 
Slaughterhouses, Refrigerators and Establishments of the Meat Industry (Published in “Diario Oficial” in September 7th 1992, modified 
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In the year 2000, Chilean beef industry showed just 10 slaughterhouses operating 
56% of the national livestock production with a higher technological level than the 105 
remaining for that year: cold rooms to offer meat cuts, and facilities to produce sausages 
and burgers. In addition, major slaughterhouses operate vertically integrated importing 
meat and linked services to supermarkets, hotels, restaurants and retail outlets. There is 
also integration with the leather industry and livestock production. (Fundación Chile, 
2000).  
For 1997, the top three plants: Fridge Lo Valledor, Refrigerator O'Higgins SA 
(Friosa) and Darc Meat concentrated more than 25% of the overall national slaughter. The 
concentration observed in the market is greater considering partnerships between 
slaughterhouses, for example, Lo Valledor and O'Higgins fridges have the property of 
slaughterhouses in the city of Temuco and the slaughterhouse Comafri in the VI Region 
(both to the south of Chile), allow them to concentrate almost 30% of the national 
slaughter; with the obvious economies of scale and the advantage to distribute meat in 
the south of the country. Another example is the Chilean Slaughterhouse Plants 
Association, consisting of 16 plants, representing about 80% of the national cattle 
slaughter and higher technological level (Fundación Chile, 2000). 
An important change happens in the middle of 2006, when the company AASA, 
owner of the biggest national slaughterhouse Lo Valledor, finished its activity because the 
increased costs and the low dollar price, moving business the south (Temuco, Concepción 
and Rancagua), where water is cheaper and can use other fuels than diesel and gas. AASA 




COMAFRI, producing approximately 312,000 heads of cattle a year or  31.05% of the total 
annual slaughter of cattle (Empresas AASA, 2010; Novoa, 2007). 
 
2.4.7 Cattle Cycle 
The cattle life cycle is determinant in the supply, and needs at least two years to 
produce steers, which are the main product for beef. Another option is produce part of 
the cycle, like breed male calves for fattening. By the other hand, females stay in the herd 
in order to produce more calves, and in the case of diary, produce milk. In order to 
produce milk the females needs to give birth; so after every milk cycle the steers 
generated could be sold. Figure 2.2 shows the life cycle for male and female cattle 
(Gutierrez, 2009; EPA, 2012a; EPA, 2012b). 
 





















Female Calf Heifer Cow 
Male Calf Steer 
Figure 2.2. Cattle Life Cycle 
 
2.5 Measuring Market Power in the Beef Sector 
Without consider the SCP approach, there are many empirical papers measuring 
buyer market power in the cattle-beef sector (Table 2.2). My focus will be the live animal 




ideas of: Schroeter (1988), Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990), Azzam and Park (1993), Stiegert, 
Azzam and Brorsen (1993), and Muth and Wohlgenant (1999).  
 
Table 2.2. Empirical Papers Measuring Buyer Market Power in the Cattle-Beef Sector  
Author (s) Year Approach 
Schoeter 1988 NEIO 
Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990 NEIO 
Azzam and Park 1993 NEIO 
Stiegert, Azzam and Brorsen 1993 NEIO 
Koontz, Garcia and Hudson 1993 NEIO-Game Theory 
Azzam* 1997 NEIO 
Koontz and Garcia 1997 NEIO-Game Theory 
Muth and Wohlgenant 1999 NEIO 
Crespi and Sexton* 2004 NEIO 
Crespi and Sexton 2005 Probabilities 
Carlberg, Hogan and Ward 2009 NEIO-Game Theory 
Cai, Stiegert and Koontz 2009 NEIO-Game Theory 
Crespi, Xia and Jones* 2010 NEIO 
Ji* 2011 NEIO 
Chung and Tostao 2009 Nonparametric 
Morrison* 2000 NEIO 
Morrison* 2001 NEIO 
*No data available to try these models  
 
2.5.1 Schroeter (1988) 
One of the first works in measure market power using NEIO in beef industry is 
Schroeter (1988), who applies the Appelbaum (1979, 1982) approach measuring 
monopoly and monopsony power using fixed proportions technology. This approach uses 
equal conjectural elasticities to measure both market powers, only differing in the 
elasticities of market demand for beef and cattle supply; he uses the following indexes 











         (2.2) 
Where: 
𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗: Lerner Index, measure of relative price distortion of monopoly 
𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗: Monopsony Price distortion index, measure of relative distortion of monopsony 
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗: jth firm`s conjectural elasticity   
𝜂𝜂: Elasticity of market demand 
𝜖𝜖: Elasticity of cattle supply 
 
To obtain those indexes, he elaborates a set of equations: cost function, demand, 
supply and the profit maximization equation for the jth firm. However, because the 
absence of disaggregate data, he focus the model on industry aggregation, using two cost 
functions in Generalized Leontief form, for the inputs capital (equation 2.3) and labor 
(equation 2.4), a beef demand equation (equation 2.5), a cattle supply equation (equation 
2.6), and the profit maximization equation (equation 2.7): 





�𝑄𝑄 + 𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾      (2.3) 





�𝑄𝑄 + 𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿        (2.4) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄 = 𝑎𝑎 +  𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝑃𝑃
𝑆𝑆1
� + 𝛾𝛾1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑃𝑃ℎ
𝑆𝑆1
� + 𝛾𝛾2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐
𝑆𝑆1
� + 𝛾𝛾3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑌𝑌
𝑆𝑆1
�+ 𝛾𝛾4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) (2.5) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄 = 𝑏𝑏 +  𝜖𝜖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝑤𝑤
𝑆𝑆2
� + 𝛿𝛿1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓
𝑆𝑆2
� + 𝛿𝛿2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠)    (2.6) 




�+�𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 2𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾(𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝐾𝐾)1/2+𝑏𝑏𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑤𝑤𝐾𝐾�   (2.7) 
Where:  
𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿: Quantity of labor input 
𝑋𝑋𝐾𝐾: Quantity of capital input 
𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿: Price of labor input 
𝑤𝑤𝐾𝐾: Price of capital labor 




𝑃𝑃: Price of beef 
𝑆𝑆1: Consumer price index 
𝑃𝑃ℎ: Wholesale price of pork 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐: Wholesale price of chicken 
𝑌𝑌: Per capita nominal income 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃: Population 
𝑤𝑤: Price of cattle 
𝑆𝑆2: Farm output price index 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓: Price of feed corn 
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠: Stock of cattle on farms 
 
To determine the conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃) he adds equation 2.8 and substitutes 
it in the profit maximization equation (equation 2.7) to identify the parameter for every 
year of the study. 
 
𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃1 + 𝜃𝜃2𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝜃𝜃3𝑤𝑤𝐾𝐾 + 𝜃𝜃4𝑡𝑡  (2.8) 
Where: 
𝑡𝑡: Annual time trend 
 
Then he runs a system of equations from equation 2.4 through 2.7 (equation 2.3 
could not be used because lack of reliable information for capital). The system is 
estimated in a quasi-first difference form by Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) 
with U.S. beef packing annual data from 1951 to 1983. 
The result shows a positive relation between cattle supply and stock, and 
statistically significant values for the conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃); which gives modest price 
distortions for the monopoly (3%) and monopsony (1%) in the lasts years of study. So he 




shown certain constant behavior since 1970, in spite of the increased concentration in 
this market. 
 
2.5.2 Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) 
Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) propose a model for test oligopsony power in 
output (meat) and input (cattle) markets with the possibility that the conjectural 
elasticities will not be equals. To make that the authors propose a simultaneous equations 
model of: a meat production function in translog functional form (equation 2.9) and four 
share equations for each of the inputs (livestock, labor, capital and non-livestock 
materials, equations 2.10 to 2.13), which come from the first order condition of the profit 
function of the meat firms. 
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Where:  
Q: is the total US commercial red meat (beef, pork, lamb and sheep) 




𝛩𝛩: Conjectural elasticity in output market 
𝛷𝛷: Conjectural elasticity in farm-input market 
𝜂𝜂: Price elasticity of output demand  





        (2.14) 
Where: 
𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘: market rice of input k 
𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘: quantity of input k 
P: market meat price 
 
The estimation method used is iterative nonlinear three stage least squares, with 
instrumental variables because the endogeneity of output and inputs, these variables 
were: labor wage, price of capital, price of materials, price of poultry, number of animal 
units as of 1 January, per-capita  disposable income and time trend. Furthermore, the 
authors use exogenous point estimates for the price elasticities obtained. 
The result shows the presence of both, oligopoly and oligopsony power of 0.46 
and 1.1 respectively.  
 
2.5.3 Azzam and Park (1993) 
Azzam and Park (1993), use Bresnahan (1982) approach with switching regression 
techniques to identify conduct changes in the cattle buying beef industry for the U.S. The 
authors assume fixed proportions between cattle and beef using two equations: cattle 
supply (equation 2.15) and beef demand (equation 2.16) to measure the market conduct 
parameter (𝜃𝜃 ) (equation 2.17). However, they add a switching technique, using a 




𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 =∝0+∝1 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 +∝2 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 +∝3 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 +∝4 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡    (2.15) 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝛽𝛽1𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  (2.16) 




        (2.18) 
Where: 
𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡: Production of beef (they assume quantity of beef is equal to quantity of cattle) 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡: Price of slaughter steers. 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Price of No 2 yellow corn 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡: Cattle inventory to January 1st 
𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡: Supply function random fluctuations 
𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣: Variable component of the measure of market conduct in factor market (cattle 
market) 
𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐: Constant component of the parameter 
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡: Transition paths of coefficients. 
𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡: Production of pork 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡: Production of poultry 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Nominal per capita disposable income 
𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡: Production worker average hourly earnings in SIC 2011 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡: Demand function random fluctuations 
 
Using annual data, they ran each equation separately, using OLS for the supply 
equation (previously tested for endogeneity using Wu-Hausman test) showing positive 
values for the price of slaughter steers. Then for the demand equation they used 
maximum likelihood with non-linear least squares techniques. The order of the 
polynomial of 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡  and the end and start of the time periods in which 𝜃𝜃  change was 
determined based on the maximum likelihood estimates.  
Then the results show that 𝜃𝜃is not constant through the time period (1960-1987), 
so they determine three periods: 1960-1977, where 𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 = 0.0093 which is extremely low 




and 1982-1987, with a decline in the parameter reaching 𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 = 0.016, in both last periods 
the value of the parameter is statistically significant showing evidence of non-competitive 
behavior. 
 
2.5.4 Stiegert, Azzam and Brorsen (1993) 
Stiegert, Azzam and Brorsen (1993) explore the buyer market power and its 
relation with the cattle supply, determining if the firms use a pricing strategy defined by 
SCP approach (an increase in the supply decreases the cattle price) or by the average 
processing cost (APC) (an increase in the supply increases the cattle price) and how the 
markdown is affected by anticipated and unanticipated supply.  
They use an equation for the anticipated and unanticipated supply (equation 2.19) 
estimated with OLS, and an empirical model, generated from a Generalized Leontief profit 
function, consisting on: a supply equation (equation 2.20), a cattle demand equation 
(equation 2.21), and labor demand equation (equation 2.22), incorporating restriction 
equations for the oligopsony industry markdown (equation 2.23) and (equation 2.24); and 
this model is running with each of the following specification equations of the markdown 
(𝑀𝑀): linear (equation 2.25), quadratic (equation 2.26) and cubic (equation 2.27).  
 




















+ 𝑑𝑑1𝐷𝐷1 + 𝑑𝑑2𝐷𝐷2 + 𝑑𝑑3𝐷𝐷3 + 𝑙𝑙1𝑞𝑞−1 + 𝜈𝜈1 
 (2.20) 















+ 𝑑𝑑4𝐷𝐷1 + 𝑑𝑑5𝐷𝐷2 + 𝑑𝑑6𝐷𝐷3 + 𝑙𝑙2𝑞𝑞−1 +
𝜈𝜈2 (2.21) 















+ 𝑑𝑑7𝐷𝐷1 + 𝑑𝑑9𝐷𝐷3 + 𝑙𝑙3(𝑥𝑥1)−1 + 𝜈𝜈3 
 (2.22) 
𝑤𝑤0∗ = 𝑤𝑤0 �1 +
𝛷𝛷
𝜂𝜂
� = 𝑤𝑤0(1 + 𝑀𝑀)        (2.23) 
𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝐶𝐶 ∗ exp (𝑀𝑀)
1+exp (𝑀𝑀)
          (2.24) 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆� + 𝑎𝑎2𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎3𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆        (2.25) 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆� + 𝑎𝑎2𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎3𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝑎𝑎4(𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆)2     (2.26) 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆� + 𝑎𝑎2𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎3𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝑎𝑎4(𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆)2 + 𝑎𝑎5(𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆)3    (2.27) 
Where: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆: Total fed cattle supply  
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇−1 ,𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇−2: Lagged terms for cattle on feed 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿−1 ,𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿−2: Lagged terms for cattle placements 
𝐷𝐷1,𝐷𝐷2,𝐷𝐷3: Seasonal dummy variables 
𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆: Error term associated to the forecast of the cattle supply, equal to: 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆�   
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆� : Forecast for total fed cattle supply 
𝑞𝑞: Total output for beef packing 
𝑤𝑤0∗,𝑤𝑤0: Retail equivalent fed cattle value  
𝑝𝑝: Retail equivalent carcass value 
𝑤𝑤1: Labor cost to process one pound of beef 
𝑤𝑤2: Average retail electricity prices 
𝑥𝑥0: Total U.S. commercial beef production 
𝑥𝑥1: Quantity of beef packing labor 
𝛷𝛷: Beef packing industry conjectural elasticity 
𝜂𝜂: Supply elasticity of beef production 




𝐶𝐶: M upper bound in inverse logit transformation 
𝑡𝑡: Quarterly time trend 
 
So they estimate the three systems ((2.20) trough (2.24) with (2.25), (2.26) and 
(2.27)) using quarterly data from 1972 through 1986 for the U.S. beef industry by iterative 
seemingly unrelated regression. 
The result shows that the markdown is statistically significant in 31 of the 59 
quarters, with a range between 0.1 to 3.8%. The authors consider this high, because using 
the average markdown value for the period of 1.31%, means a 17% of the average 
marketing margin, which is $1.54 for every 100 pounds of retail beef sold, which is 
equivalent to 62 million dollars per quarter of extra earnings for the industry. Finally the 
industry shows a tendency to the APC pricing in spite of SCP strategy in most of the 
periods. 
 
2.5.5 Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) 
 Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) develop a model to measure oligopsony power in 
the beef industry, using variable proportions technology, without using specialized input 
quantities data, just the prices, thanks to the application of the envelope theorem. So 
they propose three functional forms for the first order condition (or demand relation) 
function: a linear reduced value marginal product (equation 2.28), a log-linear marginal 
product (equation 2.29) and a squared root marginal product (equation 2.30); and a short 




























+ 𝛽𝛽10 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑥𝑥11/2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑤𝑤21/2 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑤𝑤31/2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃1/2 (2.30) 
𝑥𝑥1
𝐼𝐼






𝑇𝑇 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑇𝑇      (2.31) 
Where: 
𝑤𝑤1: Cattle price 
𝐶𝐶: Feed corn price 
𝐼𝐼: Beginning of the year inventory of cattle 
𝑥𝑥1: Cattle quantity  
𝑤𝑤2: Price of labor 
𝑤𝑤3: Price of energy 
𝑃𝑃: Wholesale price of beef 
𝑠𝑠1: Cost share of cattle in production of beef 
𝑞𝑞: Beef quantity  
𝑟𝑟1: Ratio of the price of cattle to the wholesale price of beef 
𝑇𝑇: Time trend 
𝜃𝜃: Conjectural elasticity 
 
For measure the conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃) they test three specifications: equal to 
zero, constant, and as a linear function of the time trend, equation (2.32): 
 
𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇  (2.32) 
 
So they run the three systems of equations: (2.28) and (2.31), (2.29) and (2.31), 
(2.30) and (2.31) using the three stages least squares method with annual data for the 




exogenous variables of the model plus variables that influence demand for beef, such as: 
population, consumer expenditures, retail price of pork and poultry. Then each model 
was tested against the perfect competition model ( 𝜃𝜃 = 0)  using the Gallant and 
Jorgenson`s method for test nonlinear restriction, resulting in the three models could not 
reject that 𝜃𝜃 = 0 at 5% confidence level, so there is not oligopsony power.  
 
2.6 Cattle Supply Functions Models 
In order to identify an adequate supply function, I look for different models 
available in the literature.  
 
2.6.1 Yver (1965) 
Yver (1965) suggest a cattle supply estimation for the Argentinian market using 
annual data, including the climate factor to measure the variation on production: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡    (2.33) 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐴𝐴1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐴𝐴2𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+1     (2.34) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1: Cattle production next period 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡: Cattle production actual period 
𝛼𝛼: Long term cattle supply price elasticity when the model is expressed in log form. 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡: Market price of cattle 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡: Cattle expected production actual period  
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡 : Cattle expected production next period,   
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1: Cattle stock next period, estimated through a constant born index. 





2.6.2 Tryfos (1974) 
Tryfos (1974) tries to solve the problem of negative coefficient value for price of 
cattle in supply functions estimating a generic supply (equation 2.35) and stock (equation 
2.36) functions simultaneous equation model. Then he applies it for cattle (equations 2.37 
and 2.38), calves (equations 2.39 and 2.40), and other livestock with 3SLS using annual 
data 1951 through 1970.  
 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼10 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼12𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼13𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝜇1𝑡𝑡    (2.35) 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼20 + 𝛼𝛼23𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼24𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑡𝑡      (2.36) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 1,207.5 + 0.254𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 − 0.605𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 0.863𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1   (2.37) 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 1,076.5 + 1.833𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.344𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡     (2.38) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 1,571.8 + 3.088𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 − 1.182𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 0.745𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1   (2.39) 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 459.61 + 1.372𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.238𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.348𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡   (2.40) 
Where: 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Cattle inventory 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡: Cattle price 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡: Cost of feed 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1: Cattle inventory lagged 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡: Cattle supply 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Beef cattle (beef cows, beef heifers and steers) in thousand heads 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Cattle weighted average price at public stockyards in $ per 100 lbs. deflated 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡: Index of livestock feed prices (1935-39=100) deflated 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1: Beef cattle (beef cows, beef heifers and steers) in thousand heads lagged 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Cattle total slaughter and exports in thousand heads 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Calves in thousand heads 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Calves weighted prices at public stockyards in $ per 100 lbs. deflated 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1: Calves in thousand heads lagged 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Calves total slaughter and exports in thousand heads 





2.6.3 Jarvis (1974) 
Jarvis (1974) tests price response of Argentinian cattle producers with annual data 
from 1943/44-1965/66 using OLS and instrumental variables in a model composed of 
slaughter cattle equations for: total number of animals (equation 2.41), steers, cows, 
yearlings, heifers, calves, and bulls. He uses different functions because characteristics 
like sex or age of the animal make their response to price different; for example, the 
females have more slaughter elasticity than the males, because the reproductive feature; 
also the younger animals have more slaughter elasticity than the older animals. 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3
𝑃𝑃?̇?𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓−1




+ 𝛽𝛽10𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−4 + 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡   (2.41) 
Where: 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡: Total number of animals slaughtered in year t 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡: Number of animals in the herd in year t 
𝑡𝑡: Time trend 
𝑃𝑃?̇?𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓−1
: Percentage change in price of beef relative to an index of grain prices.  
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡: Price of beef 
∆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 : Absolute change in rural labor force in year t 
𝐶𝐶?̇?𝑓
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓−1
: Percentage change in climatic index in year t 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡: Climatic index 
He found a negative short-run price response to slaughter and a positive response 
for the long run. Concluding that when the price increases generate a decrease in the 
slaughter, increasing more the price and the future supply, but then decreasing the price 





2.6.4 Arzac and Wilkinson (1979) 
Arzac and Wilkinson (1979) develop an econometric model for the livestock and 
feed grain markets for the U.S. consisting in: consumer demand for meat equations, retail 
and producer price relations, livestock production, inventory and supply relations, 
demand and supply of feed grain and market clearing equations and identities. So in the 
livestock production, inventory and supply relations section they propose two equations 
for cattle supply: Fed beef supply (equation 2.42) and non-fed beef supply (equation 
2.43). 
𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆1 = 918.2 + 0.0223𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇1 − 0.1082𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 = 0.3161𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃−2 − 0.6852𝑄𝑄2 − 0.6107𝑄𝑄3 −
0.2751𝑄𝑄4 (2.42) 
𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆2 = −2507.1 − 0.1625𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇5 + 0.067(𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼 + 0.56𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷) + 0.077(𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶−4 − 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷) −
0.157𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃4 + 0.085𝑄𝑄2 + 0.302𝑄𝑄3 + 0.317𝑄𝑄4 (2.43) 
Where: 
𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆1: Fed beef production in m. lb. 
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇1: Producer price of fed beef in cents/cwt. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1: Corn price in cents/10 bu. 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃−2: Two periods lagged cattle and calves on feed, end of period in thousand heads.  
𝑄𝑄2,𝑄𝑄3,𝑄𝑄4: Seasonal dummy variables 
𝑋𝑋𝑆𝑆2: Non-fed beef production in m. lb. 
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇5: Price of feeder steers in cents/cwt. 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼: Inventory of beef cows at the beginning of the period in thousand heads 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷: Inventory of dairy cows at the beginning of the period in thousand heads 
𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶−4: Four periods lagged net calf crop in thousand heads 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷: Dairy herd replacement at the beginning of the period in thousand heads 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃4: Prior placement of cattle and calves on fed equals to:  𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃4 = 1
4





These equations were estimated using truncated 2SLS with quarterly data from 
1957 through 1975, finding in all the supply, inventory and production equations the 
expected signs for the coefficients. 
 
2.6.5 Gutierrez, De Boer and Ospina (1982) 
Gutierrez, De Boer and Ospina (1982) create a differentiate sex simultaneous 
equations model of supply and demand equations for the Colombian cattle sector from 
1950 through 1970 using annual data. They separate the sex of the animals because the 
sales behavior could change depending on the sex; for example, if cattle price goes up, 
the farmer would like to increase the inventory of females through retention of heifers, 
generating a negative response. The same could happen for the male case; however, the 
farmer needs more resources and liquidity otherwise the response to the increase of 
cattle price will be positive. The supply-related  equations are: Male stock (equation 2.44), 
female stock (equation 2.45), male supply (equation 2.46) and female supply (equation 
2.47). 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀2 = 1,453 + 4.287𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 0.339𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 0.839𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐   (2.44) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 = 5,235 + 11.141𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 2.073𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 4.236𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 + 1.738𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚  (2.45) 
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 = 363 − 0.143𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 0.859𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 2.049𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 + 0.357𝑀𝑀2(𝑡𝑡−1)  (2.46) 
𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓 = 61 − 2.05𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 0.108𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 + 0.592𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 + 0.166𝑇𝑇2(𝑡𝑡−1)  (2.47) 
Where: 




𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎: Average real price per head of adult cattle 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶: Total credit provided to the beef sector 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐: Real price of cotton 
𝑇𝑇2: Female stock (females over three years) 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚: Real price of milk 
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚: Male sales 
𝑀𝑀2(𝑡𝑡−1): One period lagged male stock 
𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓: Female sales 
𝑇𝑇2(𝑡𝑡−1): One period lagged female stock 
 
They estimated the model using 3SLS, and the results show a positive response for 
the stock equations (2.44 and 2.45), but a greater response is shown by the females, 
which the authors attribute to the female capacity of generate greater future output. The 
supply equations (2.46 and 2.47) show a negative response in both cases. However, for 
the male equation the coefficient is low and non-significant. 
 
2.6.6 Rucker, Burt and LaFrance (1984) 
Rucker, Burt and LaFrance (1984) generate a model for cattle inventories in the 
U.S. and Montana with annual data from 1951 through 1979 using a generalization of the 
Maddala-Rao Maximum Likelihood procedure for rational lag models, allowing to divide 
the equations in non-stochastic and stochastic components. They propose two equations 
for the U.S.: Beef breeding herd inventory (equations 2.48 and 2.49) and total beef cattle 
inventory (equation 2.50). 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = −2,200 + 80.5
𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
+ 145𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−1 − 88.1𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−2 + 1.864𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝑡𝑡−1 −




𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = −233 − 794𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 + 159𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−1 − 54.5𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−2 + 1.781𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝑡𝑡−1 −
0.817𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝑡𝑡−2 + 0.534𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡−1 − 0.806𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡−2   (2.49) 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = −16,300 + 0.0781𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.0918𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−2 + 293𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−1 − 147𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−2 +
1.869𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡−1 − 0.966𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡−2 + 0.355𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡−1 − 0.642𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡−2   (2.50) 
Where: 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡: Breeding herd in thousand heads 
𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
: One period lagged beef corn price ratio in $ per cwt./$per bu. 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−1,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−2: One and two period lagged calf price in $ per cwt. 
𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝑡𝑡−1,𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝑡𝑡−2: One and two period lagged expected value of breeding herd in 
thousand heads 
𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡−1, 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡−2: One and two period lagged disturbance term 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1: One period lagged corn price in $ per cwt. 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡: Total cattle in thousand heads 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−2: One and two period lagged hay production in thousand tons  
𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡−1,𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡−2: One and two period lagged expected value of total cattle in thousand 
heads 
 
They found statistically significant coefficients for calf price and inventory, but 
for the one lag period a positive response, and then for the two lag a negative response.   
 
2.6.7 Foster and Burt (1992) 
Foster and Burt (1992) develop a dynamic model for heifers (2.51) and cows (2.52) 
inventories2 incorporating the sequential order and the biological constraints of cattle 
production. The lag model was applied to the U.S. cattle industry using annual data from 
1965 through 1990 using Burt`s (1980) non-stochastic difference equation (NSDE). 
 
2 For simplicity we are not showing in the model the values for the AR(n) coefficients. 
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𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = −251.9 + 38.5𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.103𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−2 + 1.31𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻)𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻)𝑡𝑡−2 + 1,007.9𝐷𝐷1975      
(2.51) 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = −401.1 + 215.5𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 + 0.409𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.801𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡−1    (2.52)  
Where: 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡: Replacement heifers in thousand heads 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1: Lagged replacement heifers in thousand heads 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1,𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2: Lagged calf price in dollars 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡: Mature cows in thousand heads 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−2: Lagged mature cows in thousand heads  
𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻)𝑡𝑡−1,𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻)𝑡𝑡−2,𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶)𝑡𝑡−1: Implicit functions of parameters in the equations. 
𝐷𝐷1975: Dummy variable for 1975 
 
They found a positive response of inventories respect to the calf price. 
 
2.6.8 Marsh (1994) 
Marsh (1994) creates a partial adjustment model for cattle supply based on 
farmer`s input and output price dynamics effects on the short, intermediate and long 
terms. He uses monthly data from January 1978 through June 1991 in a model composed 
of two equations: Feed supply (equation 2.53) and placement demand (equation 2.54)3, 
and determines the coefficients using 2SLS with autoregressive errors and lagged 
dependent variables entered as non-stochastic difference equations. The use of monthly 
data is considered better by the author than annual data, because reflects biological 
growth, producer`s decisions alternatives and technical rigidities. The results show a 
negative coefficient for the same month fed animal price, but positive for the same term 
3 For simplicity the model is showed in linear form and not showing the values for the AR(n) coefficients 
and seasonal dummy variables (each for the twelve months of the year) 
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one month lagged; so just the short-term price supply elasticity is negative, and the 
intermediate and long terms are positive and greater. 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 = 29.8 − 7.3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 8.9𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1 − 1.4𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−2 − 147.7𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 356.2𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 − 218.9𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−2 +
45.6𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 + 0.06𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛 + 1.0𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆   (2.53) 
𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷 = 59.4 + 11𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 9.6𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1 − 4.5𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 3.5𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 − 9.3𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 − 0.1𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛 + 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1𝐷𝐷  (2.54) 
Where: 
𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆: Fed marketings, quantity of fed steers and heifers marketed for slaughter, thousand 
head. 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Price of choice slaughter steers, dollars per hundredweight. 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1: Lagged fed cattle price, dollars per hundredweight. 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: Price of feeder steers, dollars per hundredweight. 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1,𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−2: Lagged feeder cattle price, dollars per hundredweight. 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡: Price of #2 yellow corn, dollars per bushel. 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1,𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−2: Lagged corn prices, dollars per bushel. 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆: Number of working slaughter days per month. 
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛: Inventory of cattle on feed, 7 major feeding states, thousand head.  
𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷: Feeder placements, quantity of cattle placed on feed, 7 major feeding states, 
thousand head. 
𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆 ,𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−1𝐷𝐷 : Lagged dependent variables, thousand head. 
 
2.6.9 Ward, Koontz and Schoeder (1998) 
Ward, Koontz and Schroeder (1998) determine the captive supplies' impacts on 
the market prices for fed cattle, using transaction records from U.S. slaughter plants, from 
April 5 1992 to April 3 1993. They try three models: how market transaction prices are 
affected by the delivery of fed cattle from a captive supply inventory, how prices changes 




cattle bought under captive supply. They found in general not large negative effects of 
captive supplies over fed cattle prices. 
 
2.6.10 Nerlove and Fornani (1998) 
Nerlove and Fornani (1998) develop a dynamic quasi rational expectations (QRE) 
model for the U.S. beef cattle supply based on three parts: cattleman behavior, feedlot 
and marketing sectors and consumer demand for retail beef. The cattleman behavior 
shows the supply of cattle to slaughter and the keeping of heifers to the breeding herd. 
They show the results for the equations of steer sales (equation 2.55), heifer sales plus 
herd addition (equation 2.56) and heifer sales (equation 2.57)4. The model was estimated 
using QRE generated from quarterly ARIMA model data from 1944I to 1990IV. 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = −2,6 + 0.278𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 15.1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 3.71𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1∗ + 0.182𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡   (2.55) 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = 1,014 + 0.211𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 3.09ℎ𝑡𝑡 − 8.93ℎ𝑡𝑡+1∗ + 0.135𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡  (2.56) 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = −164.4 + 0.20𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 19.54ℎ𝑡𝑡 − 0.72𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 − 16.05ℎ𝑡𝑡+1∗ + 0.19𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡  (2.57) 
Where: 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡: Steers sales (steers sold for feedlot placement or slaughter) 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡: Stock of steers 
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡: Deflated sales price of steers 
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1∗ : Expected future price of steers 
𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡: Male animals four periods of age 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡: Heifers sales (heifers sold for feedlot placement or slaughter) 
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡: Gross investment (heifers added to the reproductive herd) 
𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡: Stock of heifers 
ℎ𝑡𝑡: Deflated sales price of heifers 
ℎ𝑡𝑡+1∗ : Expected future price of heifers 
4 Unrestricted model 
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𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡: Female animals four periods of age 
 
The results show a positive response of supply for the current prices and negative 
one for the expected future prices.  
 
2.6.11 Espinosa et al. (2000) 
Espinosa et al. (2000) using annual data from 1986 through 1997 for 139 double 
purpose cattle farms, located in Mexico, divided in 2 groups: low and medium 
technological level, they develop an econometric model consisting of one profit function, 
two supply functions (for milk and beef) and five input demand functions, using the 
seemingly unrelated regression estimation method (SUR). The farm beef supply equation 
for low (equation 2.58) and medium (equation 2.59) tech levels are5: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎1 = −0.01𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 + 0.002𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 0.01𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 0.001𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 0.001𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 − 0.001𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 0.006𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 +
0.06𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 + 0.04𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 0.18𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 0.02𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣  (2.58) 
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎2 = −0.02𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 + 0.002𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 + 0.004𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 0.001𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 0.01𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 − 0.001𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 − 0.001𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 +
0.09𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 + 0.06𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 0.18𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 0.02𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣   (2.59) 
Where: 
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎1: Amount of beef produced in tons by low technological level farmers  
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎2: Amount of beef produced in tons by medium technological level farmers 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙: Milk price received by farmers 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐: Beef price received by farmers 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡: Labor Price 
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠: Supplements price 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝: Barbed wire price 
5 Values of interaction parameters are not included 
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𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚: Parasiticide price 
𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑: Diesel price 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚: Improved grassland, percentage of hectares with improved grasslands of the total 
cattle surface 
𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒: Genetic improvement, percentage of cows with European breeding of the total 
cows 
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒: Cattle management, amount in thousands of pesos of management costs, 
technical assistance and feed supplements  
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣: Investment  
 
The results show a negative response to the price of milk and a positive response 
to the price of beef, and the magnitude is almost the same in low and medium 
technological level. 
 
2.6.12 Aadland and Bailey (2001) 
Aadland and Bailey (2001) develop a model to measure short-run cattle supply for 
the U.S. cattle industry using annual data from 1944 through 1999. The model was made 
just for female animals and separating the cattle in cows (unfed beef, low quality) and 
heifer calves (fed beef, high quality) generating a system of equations with an inventory 
function for female calves, a unit cost function, two markup equations (for cows and 
heifers), two retail beef demand equations (for cows and heifers), and two first-order  
conditions for the profit maximization of the rancher (for cows and heifers).  
They estimate the parameters using the Hansen`s generalized methods of 
moments, and then use impulse response functions to measure the short-run  supply 
effects of transitory and permanent changes in the prices of calves and  then of 




positive short run supply response from heifers, and negative from cows; and for increase 
simultaneously of price of calves and cows they obtain positive response for the transitory 
shock, and negative for the permanent shock. 
 
2.6.13 Benítez-Ramírez at al. (2010) 
Benítez-Ramírez et al. (2010) develop a simultaneous equations model for the 
Mexican beef market using monthly data from 1995 through 2003. The model consists of 
one equation of supply (equation 2.60) related with three price transmission equations 
(equation 2.61, 2.62, 2.63), one equation for demand, and an identity of balance of 
external trade equation. The system was estimated using 2SLS. The results show positive 
values for the price coefficient and four months lagged price, and negative value for the 
two months lagged price of live cattle. 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 45,760,510 + 567,644𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 1,411,570𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−4 −
3,591,943𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−2 + 594,242𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 2,721,657𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 0.544𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 
 (2.60) 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 6.686 + 0.562𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡     (2.61) 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 26.163 + 0.234𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡    (2.62) 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 7.089 + 1.286𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡     (2.63) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡: Domestic production of beef carcass expressed in kg 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡: Beef carcass wholesale price ($/kg) 




𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−2: Real price of entrance to slaughterhouse of the live cattle with two months 
lag ($/kg) 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡: Real monthly price of exportation of beef carcass ($/kg) 
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡: Real CIF price of importation of sorghum ($/kg) 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1: One period lag of domestic production of beef carcass expressed in kg   
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡: Price of national boneless meat ($/kg) 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡: Real price of importation of boneless beef ($/kg) 





CHAPTER 3: DATA 
3.1 Description of Variables 
The data to construct the model corresponds to a monthly time series from April 
1993 to December 2008, from Chilean Government Institutions. The detail of the data, 
variable transformations and sources are detailed in Table 3.1. The aggregate data 
correspond to the data from the complete cattle sector (cows, heifers, veal, bulls, oxen 
and steers). The disaggregated data corresponds to separate data from: cows, heifers, 
oxen and steers. All these variables were chosen based on the features of the Chilean 
Cattle Market, and the details are given in section 4.1.2. Finally is important to notice that 







Table 3.3. Detail of the Used Variables. 
Meaning Measure Unit Source Observations 




($) per Kg 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Wholesale Price Index, base 
December 2008. 
 
Wholesale price of 
beef (Aggregated and 
disaggregated ) 
Chilean Pesos 
($) per Kg 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Wholesale Price Index, base 
December 2008.  
For the heifers wholesale price, there 
is no data available, so I use the data 
for average wholesale beef as a 
proxy..  
Quantity of cattle 
sold, which I assume 
is the same quantity 




Kg of carcass Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas (1994, 
1995,1996,1997,1998, 
1999, 2000, 2009a) 




price of corn 
 
Chilean Pesos 
($) per Kg 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) and Muñoz 
(2012) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Wholesale Price Index, base 
December 2008  
Wholesale Price of 
Urea 
Chilean Pesos 
($) per Kg 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Wholesale Price Index, base 
December 2008. 





Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
The data is available annually for 
years: 1993-1997 , 2000 and 2007, 
so I interpolate the other years, and 
then use the annual quantity equal 
for all the months of that year. 
Farm Price of Milk Chilean Pesos 
($) per liter 
(L) 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Wholesale Price Index, base 
December 2008. 
Monthly or quaterly 
Time trend 
   
Wage Cost Chilean Pesos 
($) per month 
per worker 
Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas (2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009b) 
Nominal costs deflated using Chilean 
Wholesale Price Index, base 
December 2008. 
Electricity cost Pesos ($) per 
Kilowatt hour 
(KWh) 
Comisión Nacional de 
Energía (2013) 
Nominal electricity Prices  from 
Chilean Interconnected Central 
System (SIC) Alto Jahuel deflated 







Table 3.1. Continued 




($) per Kg 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Wholesale Price Index, base 
December 2008. Used as 
Instrumental Variable only 
Quantity of Imported 
Beef  
(Aggregated) 
Kg beef Servicio Nacional de 
Aduanas (2009) 
Used as Instrumental Variable only 




($) per Kg 
Servicio Nacional de 
Aduanas (2009) 
Prices deflated using Producers Price 
Index for the U.S. (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2013) and then 
transformed to Chilean Pesos using 
monthly equivalence value Chilean 
Pesos-Dollars. 
Used as Instrumental Variable only  
Retail Price of pork Chilean Pesos 
($) per Kg 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Retail Price Index, base 
December 2008. 
Used as Instrumental Variable only 
Retail price of poultry Chilean Pesos 
($) per Kg 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Retail Price Index, base 
December 2008. 
Used as Instrumental Variable only 
Wholesale price of 
oats 
Chilean Pesos 
($) per Kg 
Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias 
(2013) 
Nominal prices deflated using 
Chilean Wholesale Price Index, base 
December 2008. Used as 
Instrumental Variable only 
Monthly Dummy   Monthly dummy variable from 
January to November for measure 
the effect of monthly market power  
Quarterly Dummy   Monthly dummy variable from the 
first to the third quarter for measure 
the effect of monthly market power  
*Only time series which is annually. 
**UF means “Unidad de Fomento”, which is a unit of account used in Chile for 
determining the cost of Real Estate, values of housing and any secured loan, either private 
or of the Chilean government. 
 
Is important to mention that the Chilean Whole Price Index is from Oficina de 
Estudios y Políticas Agrarias (2012), the U.S. Dollar prices is from Banco Central (2013), 
and the U.S. PPI is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013). 
All the econometric tests and the system of equations were made with the 




3.2 Data Plots 
3.2.1 Aggregate Data 
Figures 3.1 to 3.5 show the plots for the aggregate variables in time, these figures show 
the differences and patterns among the time series. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Wholesale and Farm Prices (Real Prices Dec 2008) 


























































































Figure 3.4. Cattle Sold  
Elaborated from: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2009a)  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Prices of Wholesale Corn (Pcorn) and urea (Purea), and Farmer Milk (Pmilk) 






































































































































































Figure 3.6. Wage Cost 




Figure 3.7. Electricity Price 































































































































































































3.2.2 Disaggregated Data 
Figures 3.6 to 3.9 show the plots for disaggregate variables in time, these figures 
show the differences and patterns among the time series. 
 
Figure 3.8. Farm Cattle Supply to Slaughterhouses  
Elaborated from: Oficina de Estudios y Políticas Agrarias (2013) 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Farm Cattle Prices (Real Prices Dec 2008) 
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Figure 3.10. Wholesale Beef Prices (Real Prices Dec 2008) 
Elaborated from: Oficina de Estudios y Políticas Agrarias (2013) 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Wholesale and Farm Prices (Real Prices Dec 2008) 
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CHAPTER 4: MODEL ESTIMATION 
4.1 Selecting the Appropriated Model 
After try several models (shown in table 4.1.), I decided to select 2 models: 
Aggregated modified Muth and Wohlgenant model and the modified sex separate model 
based on Muth and Wohlgenant. The reason to select those models is because they 
provide a better model of the Chilean Cattle Market (variables used) and give the same 









Table 4.4. Models Tried 
 Model Time 
Series 
Comments 
1 Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) based 
model* 
Monthly  3 models with 2 equations 
each, in 4 scenarios 
2 Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) based 
model with inverse supply* 
Monthly 3 models with 2 equations 
each, in 4 scenarios 
3 Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) based 
model* 
Quarterly  3 models with 2 equations 
each, in 4 scenarios 
4 Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) based 
model with inverse supply* 
Quarterly  3 models with 2 equations 
each, in 4 scenarios 
5 Alternative aggregate model* Monthly 1 model with 2 equations, in 3 
scenarios 
6 Alternative aggregate model with inverse supply* Monthly 1 model with 2 equations, in 3 
scenarios 
7 Alternative aggregate model* Quarterly  1 model with 2 equations, in 3 
scenarios 
8 Alternative aggregate model with inverse supply* Quarterly  1 model with 2 equations, in 3 
scenarios 
9 Alternative Sex separate model*  Monthly 4 models with 2 equations, in 3 
scenarios 
10 Alternative Sex separate model* Monthly 4 models with 2 equations, in 3 
scenarios 
11 Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) based 
model with AR(1) process*  
Monthly 1 model with 2 equations, in 4 
scenarios 
12 Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) based 
model with AR(1) process and first difference* 
Monthly 1 model with 2 equations, in 4 
scenarios 
13 Modified Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999) based model with AR(1) process* 
Monthly 1 model with 2 equations, in 4 
scenarios 
14 Modified Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999) based model with AR(1) process and 
seasonal difference* 
Monthly 1 model with 2 equations, in 4 
scenarios 
15 Modified Sex separate Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999) based model with AR(1) process* 
Monthly 4 models with 2 equations, in 4 
scenarios 
16 Modified Sex separate Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999) based model with AR(1) process and 
seasonal difference* 
Monthly 4 models with 2 equations, in 4 
scenarios 
17 Modified Aggregate Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999) based model with AR(1) and AR(2) 
Monthly 4 models with 2 equations, in 4 
scenarios 
18 Modified Sex separate Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999) based model with AR(1) and AR(2) 
Monthly 4 models with 2 equations, in 4 
scenarios 
 
4.1.1 Derivation of Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) Model 
I detail the derivation of Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) model because is the main 




They start the model with a profit equation for a representative firm “i” that buy 
cattle from farmers and sell the beef into the wholesale market (equation 4.1): 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝑤𝑤1𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤`𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖      (4.1.) 
Where: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖= Profit  
𝑃𝑃= Deflated output price 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)= Output (beef) production function 
𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖= Main input (cattle) quantity 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖= Vector of quantities of other inputs, like energy or labor. 
𝑤𝑤1= Main input (cattle) price 
𝑤𝑤`= Deflated price of other inputs, like energy or labor. 
 
Deriving the profit (equation 4.1) respect to quantity of cattle (𝑋𝑋1), for the case of 












       (4.3.) 
Deriving the profit (equation 4.1.) respect to quantity of cattle (𝑋𝑋1), for the case 
of imperfect competition for the main input (𝑋𝑋1) market, but perfect competition for the 



































𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋1,𝑍𝑍) = 𝑤𝑤1, price function of 𝑋𝑋1 
𝑍𝑍= Vector of cattle supply shifters (i.e. price of cattle food) 
 











    (4.6) 
Now averaging all firms in industry. So applying sum operator and dividing by the 





















� = 𝜃𝜃, conjectural elasticity for market power. 𝜃𝜃 = 0, is perfect competition, 
𝜃𝜃 = 1, is monopsony, 0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1, some degree of oligopsony power. 
 











= Average Marginal product of 𝑋𝑋1 (from all over all firms) 
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋1,𝑍𝑍)
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1
= Average Marginal cost of 𝑋𝑋1(from all over all firms) 
𝜃𝜃= Average input conjectural elasticity (from all over all firms) 
 
Equation 4.8 requires data of quantity of non-specialized inputs (𝑋𝑋 , i.e. labor, 
energy, capital) because are components of the marginal product of cattle�𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋)
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1
�, but 
maybe data is not available, like the case of Chilean Cattle Industry. So for this reason the 
authors apply the envelope theorem to the firm profit equation. Thus after doing this I do 




interpreted like they assume that the production could be separated between the non-
specialized inputs and the main input, which is an strong assumption, however for the 
case of the Chilean Cattle Market, this values have not changed drastically between the 
years of study so we can assume a constant value for them and use this model 
assumption. The model assume two non-specialized (labor and energy) the new firm 
profit function is: 
𝜋𝜋(𝑃𝑃,𝑋𝑋1,𝑍𝑍,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3) = 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2∗,𝑋𝑋3∗) − 𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋1,𝑍𝑍)𝑋𝑋1 − 𝑤𝑤2𝑋𝑋2∗ − 𝑤𝑤3𝑋𝑋3∗ (4.9) 
Where: 
𝑤𝑤2= Deflated price of labor 
𝑤𝑤3= Deflated price of energy 
𝑋𝑋2∗= Optimal quantity of labor conditioned to the level of specialized input (𝑋𝑋1), defined 
as the function 𝑋𝑋2∗=𝑋𝑋2(𝑃𝑃,𝑋𝑋1,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3) 
𝑋𝑋3∗= Optimal quantity of energy conditioned to the level of specialized input (𝑋𝑋1), defined 
as the function 𝑋𝑋3∗=𝑋𝑋3(𝑃𝑃,𝑋𝑋1,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3) 
 
Now applying FOC with respect to the specialized input (𝑋𝑋1), where the non-
specialized inputs (𝑋𝑋2,𝑋𝑋3) are purchased in perfect competition, the specialized input (𝑋𝑋1) 
























= 0  (4.10) 





















So because they assume perfect competitive market where 𝑋𝑋2 and 𝑋𝑋3 where 













          (4.12) 








          (4.13) 
So now the marginal product is defined over the prices (𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3) instead of the 
quantities (𝑋𝑋2, 𝑋𝑋3) of non-specialized inputs. Now applying the logic for identify oligopoly 
power (only the reduced form parameters of the marginal cost function are required to 
obtain the market power) to this model, the degree of oligopsony power can be estimated 




𝑋𝑋1 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑤𝑤2 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑤𝑤3 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃   (4.14) 
So to complete the model I need a supply equation, so they use a short-run supply 
response from cattle producers: 
𝑥𝑥1
𝐼𝐼






𝑇𝑇 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑇𝑇      (4.15) 
 
Where: 
𝐶𝐶: Regular corn price 
𝐼𝐼: Inventory of cattle 
𝑇𝑇: Time trend 
𝑥𝑥1
𝐼𝐼





To complete the identification I need to find �𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋1,𝑍𝑍)
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1
� from the supply equation, 







𝑇𝑇 = −𝛿𝛿0 +
𝑥𝑥1
𝐼𝐼






𝑇𝑇� = −𝛿𝛿0 +
𝑥𝑥1
𝐼𝐼



































𝑋𝑋1  (4.20) 







� = 0  (4.21) 







�  (4.22) 
Now substituting this expression in equation 4.22 yield to the final empirical 
specification of the FOC (demand relation):  











𝑋𝑋1 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑤𝑤2 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑤𝑤3 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃  (4.24) 
So with supply and demand equations (4.15 and 4.24) I can make up the system 




In addition the authors measure if the model is sensitive to changes in the 
functional form of the demand equation, so they add two alternatives functional forms: 
first order partial derivative of a log-linear form and of a generalized Leontief form.  
The log linear form comes from the assumption that the log derivative of 𝑓𝑓(∙) with 





�𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑋𝑋1) + 𝛾𝛾12𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤2) + 𝛾𝛾13𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤3) + 𝛾𝛾1𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃)�  (4.25) 
Where: 
𝑞𝑞 = 𝑓𝑓(∙), Quantity of beef 
 







�𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑋𝑋1) + 𝛾𝛾12𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤2) + 𝛾𝛾13𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤3) + 𝛾𝛾1𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃)� (4.26) 











+ 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥1) + 𝛾𝛾12𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤2) + 𝛾𝛾13𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤3) + 𝛾𝛾1𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃)
 (4.27) 
Where: 
𝑠𝑠1: Cost share of cattle in production of beef 
 
For the generalized Leontief form the Marginal product from the equation (4.14) 
is approximated by: 
𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1
= 𝛽𝛽10 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑥𝑥11/2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑤𝑤21/2 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑤𝑤31/2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃1/2  (4.28) 











+ 𝛽𝛽10 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑥𝑥11/2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑤𝑤21/2 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑤𝑤31/2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃1/2 
 (4.29) 
Where: 
𝑟𝑟1: Ratio of the price of cattle to the wholesale price of beef 
 
So they finally have 3 models to determine market power:  the short-run supply 
equation (4.14) and one demand, but trying with three kinds of functional forms of the 
demand function: a linear reduced value marginal product (4.24), a log-linear marginal 



























+ 𝛽𝛽10 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑥𝑥11/2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑤𝑤21/2 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑤𝑤31/2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃1/2 (4.29) 
𝑥𝑥1
𝐼𝐼






𝑇𝑇 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑇𝑇       (4.15) 
Where: 
𝑤𝑤1: Cattle price 
𝐶𝐶: Regular corn price 
𝐼𝐼: Inventory of cattle 
𝑥𝑥1: Cattle quantity 
𝑤𝑤2: Price of labor 
𝑤𝑤3: Price of energy 
𝑃𝑃: Wholesale price of beef 
𝑠𝑠1: Cost share of cattle in production of beef 
𝑞𝑞: Beef quantity  
𝑟𝑟1: Ratio of the price of cattle to the wholesale price of beef 
𝑇𝑇: Time trend 





For measure the conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃) they test three specifications:  𝜃𝜃 equal 
to zero, 𝜃𝜃 as a constant, and as a linear function of the time trend, equation 4.30: 
𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇  (4.30) 
 
4.1.2 Adapting Muth and Wohlgenant Model to Chilean Cattle Market 
In order to use Muth and Wohlgenant model I need to modify the demand and 
supply equations according to the Chilean reality, because like we said before the Chilean 
Cattle Market features special characteristics like: Beef producers are poor and low qualified, 
beef is a byproduct of milk production, types of production: central intensive, and south 
extensive, geographical and market concentration of beef packing, beef law (1993) and increasing 
demand, increasing role of importation and cattle cycle. Unfortunatelly I cannot include all of 
these in the model because lack of data for the case of the small beef producers, the difference 
in geographic concentration and the increasing role of supermarkets in the industry. Also for the 
case of the importance in imports and the increase for demand of beef, these two are not well 
adapted into the Muth and Wohlgenant market power model. However, the rest of the features 
are included like I explain in the nexts paragraphs. 
 For the demand equation, I will use the similar variables: price of electricity and 
cost of wage, because according to Maino et al. (1997) energy and labor are the most 
important components of the total cost of processing the animal, representing between 
54.2% and 83.3%. 
 Then for the supply function I include more variables in order to have a better 




corn as one of the main components of the diet in intensive production systems (feedlots) 
and urea, a fertilizer used to improve the quality of the grasslands in extensive production 
systems. Remember that extensive and intensive production systems exist in Chile 
(Verdugo, 2004);   
 I add farmer's price of milk as a variable, because like I said before the Chilean 
beef production is related to milk production, in fact, the beef breeds only represent 25% 
of total beef cattle dedicated to the country (Campos et al., 2009; Oficina de Estudios y 
Políticas Agrarias, 2007; Fundación Chile, 2006; Fundación Chile, 2005; Dresdner, 2004).  
 Also I will include a lagged term for the quantity of the cattle sold by farmers, in 
order to model the behavior of the cattle farmer; who acts according to the cattle life 
cycle, so they make the decision to produce anticipated.    
 So the Chilean cattle supply will be: 
𝑃𝑃
𝐼𝐼
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑄𝑄12 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑇𝑇  (4.31) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎= Wholesale Price of Urea 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛= Wholesale price of corn 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘= Farm Price of Milk 
𝑇𝑇= Time trend 
𝑄𝑄12
𝑓𝑓 = 12 months lagged quantity of cattle sold 
 
To complete the identification I need to find �𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃
𝑓𝑓
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃
� from the supply equation, so 















































   (4.34) 





= 0         (4.35) 
Now substituting this expression in the Chilean demand equation (4.14) yield to 




� [𝜃𝜃]𝑄𝑄 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  (4.36) 




+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡   (4.37) 
Also for the measure the conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃) I will use the equation 4.30, so 
the final system of equation will be: 





+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  (4.38) 
𝑃𝑃
𝐼𝐼
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑄𝑄12 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑇𝑇   (4.31) 
Also, like Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) I will test the model for a fixed conjectural 
elasticity (𝜃𝜃), so the model will be: 





+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡   (4.39) 
𝑃𝑃
𝐼𝐼
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑄𝑄12 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑇𝑇  (4.31) 
Also I will try the monthly dummy model for the conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃): 
𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝐽𝐽𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏 + 𝜃𝜃3𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 + 𝜃𝜃4𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 + 𝜃𝜃5𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 + 𝜃𝜃6𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙 + 𝜃𝜃7𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙 + 𝜃𝜃8𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝑔𝑔 +




4.2 Market Power Estimation in Chilean Cattle Market 
4.2.1 The Aggregate Model 
So as discussed before I follow the NEIO approach from Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999), I tried a model which consists in a demand equation (in a linear reduced value 
marginal product (equation 4.38)), and a supply function adapted to the Chilean cattle 
market (equation 4.31),  




+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  (4.39) 
𝑃𝑃
𝐼𝐼
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑄𝑄12 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑇𝑇  (4.31) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓: Chilean cattle farm price 
𝐶𝐶: Chilean wholesale corn price 
𝐼𝐼: Inventory of Chilean cattle 
𝑄𝑄: Cattle quantity 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒: Chilean price of labor 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐: Chilean price of electricity 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤: Chilean wholesale price of beef 
𝑇𝑇: Monthly time trend 
𝜃𝜃: Conjectural elasticity 
 
For measure the conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃) I tried the three used specification plus 
a new one a monthly based dummy in the form of equation 4.40. 
4.2.2 The Sex Separate Model 
Following the same approach from the aggregate model I generate separate 
models for: cows, heifers, steers and oxen (based in the data availability). So I have four 
new models, consisting in four short-run supply equations and four demand equations, in 










+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤  (4.41) 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤12 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑇𝑇  (4.42) 
Heifers: 





+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  (4.43) 
𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖12 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑇𝑇  (4.44) 
Steers: 





+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒   (4.45) 
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢
𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒12 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑇𝑇  (4.46) 
Oxen: 





+ 𝛼𝛼1𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥   (4.47) 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥
𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥12 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑇𝑇  (4.48) 
In this way I will run the 4 system separately and obtain the conjectural hypothesis 
for each of the animal classes.  
 For measure the conjectural elasticities (𝜃𝜃) I tried the same approaches tested in 
the aggregate model. 
Extra notes about the estimation: 
-Here I do not use first differences forms (M&W uses them), because I do not find 




-Inventory variable is an annual variable, not monthly, so I repeat the same value 
for all the 12 months of the correspondent year. 
-M&W Use annual data (26 observations), I use monthly from April 1993 to 
December 2008 (189 observations) 
-3 Stages Least Squares was tested using Eviews 8 software, with Cattle Price (𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓), 
Cattle quantity (𝑄𝑄 ), Inventory (𝐼𝐼 ) and wholesale price of beef (𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 ) as endogenous 
variables, the rest are exogenous, and also I add other instrumental variables: Wholesale 
Price of Ammonium phosphate, Quantity of Imported Beef, CIF Price of Beef Imports, 
Retail Price of pork and Retail price of poultry, quantity of veal, quantity of bulls, 
wholesale price of oats, and also the one period lagged variables correspondent to each 
equation and dummy variables. In Appendix A I compare the different instrumental 
variables based on their correlation with the endogenous variables. Also based on those 
tables we can conclude that the instruments used are weak and in some cases they do 
not accomplished a low correlation with LHS variables and high correlation with RSH 
variables. So to deal with this issue we tried with lagged terms of the same variables, 
finding better instruments.  
-I also run the model in weighted OLS and weighted 2SLS, in order to have a 
comparison values for the 3SLS models, results for all the AR(1) process models are shown 
in Appendix C.   
-I run the model with first order autoregressive terms AR(1) and second order 




-In order to check for relevant structural changes in the elasticities of supply and 
demand during the period of study, I try running the model adding interaction terms, 
between price of corn and price of urea, finding only statistical significant results for the 
aggregated model, however not for the sex separate models. So I do not include this in 
the final results.  
-In the supply function I get rid of the constant term, because without it the model 
fits better 
 
4.3 Econometric Tests 
I tested the model for unit root in variables and residues, cointegration of the residues, 
and serial correlation of the residues. Also I test for normality of the residues; however 
this additional test is shown in appendix section B.  
 
4.3.1 Augmented Dickey Fuller over Variables 
I test for Stationarity of the variables with the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test 
(Table 4.2), finding beef wholesale price (𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤), wholesale price of corn (𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛), farmers 
price of milk ( 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 ), farm price of cow ( 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 ), wholesale price of cow beef  
(𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤), farm price of heifers (𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖), wholesale price of heifer beef (𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖), wholesale  
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑁𝑁𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓(𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ), farm price of oxen (𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥), wholesale price of oxen beef 
(𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥) and oxen lagged 12 months (𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥12)  stationary at level form. Then the rest of the 




and heifers lagged 12 months (𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖12), which are stationary in second difference form. So 
these results tell me that I the variables for the models are stationary in first difference 
form, so the variables must be included in the model in first difference form, in order to 
deal with non-stationarity and to deal with problems in the statistical inference from the 
variables; the model was tried in first difference without obtaining any substantial 
difference with the model in level form. Also because of these results I make the same 
























Second Difference  
p-value 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓  0.1635 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄 0.7226 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝐼𝐼 0.2677 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 0.1894 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐  0.9992 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 0.0870* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎  0.6450 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛  0.0438** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘  0.0033*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄12 0.1193 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤  0.0509* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤  0.7363 0.0017*** 0.0000*** 
𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 0.7117 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤  0.0526* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤12 0.6740 0.0025*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  0.0840* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  0.2874 0.0010*** 0.0000*** 
𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  0.9714 0.4098 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  0.0872* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖12 0.3171 0.0081 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 0.1169 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 0.1879 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 0.9981 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 0.0841* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒12 0.3306 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥  0.0670* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥  0.5914 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥  0.9248 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥  0.0213** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥12 0.0084*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
4.3.2 Augmented Dickey Fuller over Residues 
Testing the ADF Test for the residuals of the models (Table 4.3), from each 
equation and also as a group, I found that all the models reject the null hypothesis of unit 
root in their residues, except for: the aggregate model with AR(1) term (constant, variable 
and dummy equations), the oxen model with AR(1) and AR(2) terms (dummy equation); 




that the residues from almost all the models do not have unit root, so they are stationary 
in level form. 
 
Table 4.6. ADF Over Residues of the Models 






Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.2396 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.8122 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.3720 
Aggregate Model 
AR(1)AR(2) 
Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 
Cow AR(1) Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 
Cow AR(1)AR(2) Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 
Heifer AR(1) Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 
Heifer AR(1)AR(2) Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 
Ox AR(1) Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 
Ox AR(1)AR(2) Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.3104 
Steer AR(1) Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Dummy 0.0000 0.0000 
Steer AR(1)AR(2) Constant 𝜃𝜃 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 0.0000 0.0000 
𝜃𝜃 = 0 0.0000 0.0000 




4.3.3 Johansen Cointegration Test 
Testing for cointegration with Johansen Test (Table 4.4), among all the variables 
shows cointegration in the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests. So in the long run the 
variables are cointegrated for all the models. So the variables for each of the models are 
well behaved relative to stationarity and they do not origin problems relative to statistical 
inference.  
 
Table 4.7. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 




𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓, 𝑄𝑄, 𝐼𝐼, 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐, 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤, 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛, 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘, 𝑄𝑄12 
2 Coint eqs at 0.05 
level 
2 coint eqs at 0.05 level 
Cow Model 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 , 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 , 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 , 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 , 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤, 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 , 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 , 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 , 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤12 
3 Coint eqs at 0.05 
level 
2 Coint eqs at 0.05 level 
Heifer Model 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 , 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 , 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 , 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 ,  
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖12 
1 Coint eqs at 0.05 
level 
1 Coint eqs at 0.05 level 
Steer Model 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 , 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 , 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 , 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 ,  
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ,𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 , 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒, 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒, 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒12 
3 Coint eqs at 0.05 
level 
1 Coint eqs at 0.05 level 
Ox Model 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 , 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 , 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 , 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 ,  
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥, 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥 , 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥 , 𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥, 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥12 
4 Coint eqs at 0.05 
level 
2 Coint eqs at 0.05 level 
 
4.3.4 Durbin Watson Test for Serial Correlation 
The models show mainly positive serial correlation or no serial correlation in inverse 
demand and supply equations, after running the Durbin Watson test (Table 4.5). Is 
important to notice that before use the AR terms the equations shows negative serial 




Also I tried first difference and seasonal difference, however not finding any 
improvements I discard those models. 
 
Table 4.8. Durbin Watson Test results 
 Model Equation M&W Cow Heifer Ox Steer 
 zeroar1ar2 Inv. Dem NO NO NO NO NO  Supply NO NO NO NO NO 
 constar1ar2 Inv. Dem + + NO + +  Supply NO NO NO NO NO 
 varar1ar2 Inv. Dem + + NO + +  Supply NO NO NO NO NO 
 dumar1ar2 Inv. Dem NO ? + + +  Supply ? NO NO NO NO 
 zeroar1 Inv. Dem NO NO ? NO NO  Supply - + ? NO NO 
 constar1 Inv. Dem + + + + ?  Supply - + + NO NO 
 varar1 Inv. Dem + + + + +  Supply - + + NO NO 
 dumar1 Inv. Dem + ? + + +  Supply - + + NO NO 
+=positive serial correlation, -=negative serial correlation, NO=no serial correlation, ?=not 
conclusive test 
 
4.4 Aggregate Model Results 
I run the model with 3SLS with AR(1) terms for supply and demand equations, 
finding that some of the coefficient for AR(1) are close to one, so I run the model with the 
coefficients for AR(1) and AR(2) shows less close to one. The results for the models are 








Table 4.9. Results from M&W Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) Terms 
Coef 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  -0.113427 0.404693 -0.013536 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.001498 -0.000902 
𝜃𝜃2    -0.002816 
𝜃𝜃3    -0.000794 
𝜃𝜃4    -0.001213 
𝜃𝜃5    -0.001018 
𝜃𝜃6    -0.00247 
𝜃𝜃7    -0.003637 
𝜃𝜃8    -0.004617 
𝜃𝜃9    -0.004378 
𝜃𝜃10    -0.003162 
𝜃𝜃11    -0.001478 
𝛼𝛼1 0.0000000692* -0.000000334 0.000000573 -0.000000047 
𝛼𝛼2 -0.000158* -0.000685 -0.000157 -0.0000373 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.016777** -0.048248 -0.08508 -0.037048*** 
𝛼𝛼4 0.42197*** 0.366597** 0.354626* 0.305621*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.553101*** 0.999288*** 0.989451*** 0.61766*** 
𝛿𝛿1 0.11079 0.122204 0.09915 0.017922 
𝛿𝛿2 0.20103 0.287413** 0.253341* 5.059165*** 
𝛿𝛿3 0.448069 0.494016 0.527159 0.442458 
𝛿𝛿4 0.950397*** 0.750543** 0.892758** 1.076911*** 
𝛿𝛿5 0.049857 0.054916 0.048256 -0.310371** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.002599 0.002244 0.002174 -0.007149** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.569891*** 0.559965*** 0.558267*** 0.583454*** 
Statistical Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  
In the expected demand equation, I find an statistically non significant and close 
to zero relation between farm price of cattle (𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓) and Cattle quantity 𝑄𝑄, which could be 
explained because the technology approximates a constant return to scale, therefore the 
effect of output prices in input prices dominates (Muth and Wohlgenant, 1999).  
The coefficients for the wage and electricity inputs shows negative values for all 
the electricity and wage cost cases, but electricity shows a little more statistical  
significance; this could indicate that the energy is a more determinant input in the cost 
structure of the slaughterhouses. Also, like Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) indicates, the 
negative relation between inputs and cattle prices is explained by two opposite effects 




input and toward an increase in demand for cattle; however the increase in price of input 
also generates decrease in the production of the output and so on a decrease in the 
demand for cattle. For this cases the negative effect predominates.  
The coefficient for the wholesale price of beef is positive and statistically 
significant in almost all the models, which make sense because an increase in the price of 
processed beef will increase the price of cattle. This also could be indicating price 
transmission from slaughterhouses to producers.  
The AR(1) parameter shows highly statistical significant values, but only close to 
one in the cases of constant and variable conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃); this indicates positive 
serial correlation of the errors.  
The supply function shows a statistically non significant and positive relation 
between the ratio cattle quantity and Inventory (𝑃𝑃
𝐼𝐼
) and the farm price of cattle (𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓); 
which is sign expected, but the statistical non significance could be showing issues related 
with the structure of the cattle in Chile, mainly for milk production so beef is a sub product 
of the milk market.  
The coefficient for the price of urea shows positive and statistically significant 
values for all the models, which is not expected, because it was considered an input in 
extensive cattle, systems based in pastures, so a cost component.  
The coefficient for the price of corn shows positive and statistically non significant 




The coefficient for the farm price of milk is statistically significant in all models, 
and shows positive values, which is not expected because if the prices of the milk increase, 
the sacrificed animals must decrease in a milk production based cattle.  
The coefficient for the one year (12 months) lagged quantity of sacrificed cattle is 
positive and statistically non significant for the models except for the monthly dummy 
that is significant and negative, which make sense in relation with the seasonality of the 
cattle cycle, and for the case of the dummy, this seasonality is disaggregated. The time 
trend coefficient shows similar results that the lagged quantity of sacrificed animals.  
The AR(1) coefficient shows values positives and highly statistically significant, but 
not close to one, so show not serial correlation for this function. 
 The values for the conjectural elasticities show mainly negative values between 
zero and negative one, and statistically not significant, so are equivalent to zero. The 
negative signs are different from Muth and Wohlgenant Model, but the non statistical 
significance is the same. So this indicates not market power or imperfect market structure 
for cattle buyers. The dummy model coefficients do not show any significant parameters 
for the monthly dummy variables, however, shows different values in each dummy, which 
could be interpreted as a variation in the market power through the year. 
 The cattle conjectural elasticity (𝜃𝜃) measures the percentage change in the total 
packing industry purchase of cattle when a particular firm purchase change in 1%, this is 
expected to be positive related, so the increase of a particular firm in 1% will increase the 
purchase of all the industry in certain percentage. The expected values for this elasticity 




so, none of them could influence the rest), 1 for the monopsonistic case (because in that 
case, there will be a one by one response, so there is only one firm the whole market) and 
also intermediate values, showing degrees of oligopsony. So based on that interpretation, 
negative values or greater than 1, are not expected, however, in our results we have some 
negative values but in general very close to zero. Without these exceptions, the results 
are very similar to the original Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) paper, they said about the 
negative values are possible just because the sample variation. Other explanation could 
be just a negative response to the purchase of a firm, so if a firm purchase cattle increase 
in 1% the industry reduces the purchase in certain percentage, which could be possible 
under some conditions of information and a different strategy from the rest of the 
industry, in which the industry tries to contract in response to an expansion of some firm 














Table 4.10. M&W Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) and AR(2) Terms 
Coef Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0 0.085062 0.135633  0.113862 
𝜃𝜃1  0.000225  -0.023429 
𝜃𝜃2    0.026456 
𝜃𝜃3    -0.025077 
𝜃𝜃4    0.014362 
𝜃𝜃5    -0.019716 
𝜃𝜃6    0.02246 
𝜃𝜃7    0.002613 
𝜃𝜃8    0.038419 
𝜃𝜃9    0.0086 
𝜃𝜃10    0.032468 
𝜃𝜃11    -0.01427 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.00000198 -0.0000035 0.0000000712** 0.0000000158 
𝛼𝛼2 0.00089 0.001436 -0.0000943 0.00034 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.111485 -0.037726 -0.017903** 0.033382 
𝛼𝛼4 0.264439 0.07971 0.397538*** 0.287225*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) -0.539847 -0.937695* -0.000994 0.990233*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) 1.472484*** 1.93985*** 0.572268*** 0.013946 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.011796 -0.011803 -0.016119 -0.115303 
𝛿𝛿2 0.296284** 0.309428** 0.25966* 7.37166*** 
𝛿𝛿3 0.859099** 0.872199** 0.717731** 0.258583 
𝛿𝛿4 1.061371*** 1.031684*** 1.054433*** 0.57483* 
𝛿𝛿5 0.037891 0.039258 0.07945 -0.264451*** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.00153 0.001471 0.001859 -0.010056*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.309384*** 0.310997*** 0.269229*** 0.459365*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) 0.405945*** 0.40519*** 0.425723*** 0.346851*** 
Statistical Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  
The model with AR(1) and AR(2) terms shows different parameters values than 
the AR(1) model: In the inverse demand equation I have more positive values for the 
conjectural elasticity, some positive values for the price of cattle in response at the 
quantity, which is not expected. Also the price of wage coefficient is mainly positive, 
which is also unexpected. 
The AR terms are far from 1, the only exception is the dummy model which shows 
a close to one AR(1) term. In the supply of cattle equation I have a negative relation 




significance of the coefficient of price of urea, price of corn and price of milk increase their 
significance. 
So the new model gives us a decrease on the frequency of serial correlation, with 
respect at the relations between variables does not give us relevant results. 
 
4.5 Sex Separate Models Results 
I run the model with 3SLS with AR(1) terms for supply and demand equations, 
finding that some of the coefficient for AR(1) are close to one (Tables 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 and 
4.11), so I run the model with AR(1) and AR(2), decreasing the AR values close to one 
(Tables 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15) 
Table 4.11. Results from Cows Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) Terms 
Coef 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  0.014904 0.136496 0.064011 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.000523 0.003832 
𝜃𝜃2    0.008781 
𝜃𝜃3    -0.001434 
𝜃𝜃4    0.000623 
𝜃𝜃5    -0.004402 
𝜃𝜃6    0.003434 
𝜃𝜃7    0.013361 
𝜃𝜃8    0.020392 
𝜃𝜃9    0.026625 
𝜃𝜃10    0.017368 
𝜃𝜃11    0.00743 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.000229 -0.000821 -0.002552 -0.000542 
𝛼𝛼2 -0.0000815 -0.000934 -0.00069 -0.000631 
𝛼𝛼3 0.009031 -0.079686 -0.050948 -0.041323 
𝛼𝛼4 0.429783*** 0.294599* 0.2233 0.160006 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.557895*** 1.000395*** 1.0027*** 0.99844*** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.0000551 -0.0000487 -0.0000426 -0.0000642 
𝛿𝛿2 0.000454*** 0.000451*** 0.000467*** 0.000491*** 
𝛿𝛿3 0.000206 0.000184 0.000155 0.0000249 
𝛿𝛿4 0.000336 0.000309 0.000276 -0.00015 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00000028** 0.000000294*** 0.000000301*** 0.000000573*** 
𝛿𝛿6 -0.00000229 -0.00000229 -0.00000231 -0.00000229* 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.679891*** 0.678171*** 0.678019*** 0.608137*** 




Table 4.12. Heifers Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) Terms 
Coef 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  0.096648 0.147009 0.147392 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.000111 0.014721 
𝜃𝜃2    0.023043 
𝜃𝜃3    0.009867 
𝜃𝜃4    0.018312 
𝜃𝜃5    0.013716 
𝜃𝜃6    0.035699 
𝜃𝜃7    0.053509 
𝜃𝜃8    0.066465 
𝜃𝜃9    0.082695 
𝜃𝜃10    0.050893 
𝜃𝜃11    0.027155 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.000834*** -0.003757 -0.005047 -0.000431 
𝛼𝛼2 0.000454*** -0.000839 -0.000716 -0.000867 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.025429** -0.124756 -0.127045 -0.05334 
𝛼𝛼4 0.395976*** 0.398953 0.412853 0.433002 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.64477*** 1.000516*** 1.001268*** 0.935918*** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.0000481 -0.0000512 -0.0000516 -0.0000993 
𝛿𝛿2 0.000522*** 0.000484*** 0.00049*** 0.000554*** 
𝛿𝛿3 -0.000161 -0.000164 -0.000163 -0.000442 
𝛿𝛿4 0.000274 0.000403 0.000396 0.000444 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00000125*** 0.0000012*** 0.0000012*** 0.00000144*** 
𝛿𝛿6 -0.00000162 -0.00000148 -0.00000146 -0.00000352 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.533496*** 0.554705*** 0.55517*** 0.506656*** 














Table 4.13. Steers Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) Terms 
Coef 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  0.350145 -0.389632 -0.081918 
𝜃𝜃1   0.002743 0.032668** 
𝜃𝜃2    0.047872*** 
𝜃𝜃3    0.019978** 
𝜃𝜃4    0.058782** 
𝜃𝜃5    0.040824** 
𝜃𝜃6    0.063608*** 
𝜃𝜃7    0.064204*** 
𝜃𝜃8    0.059571*** 
𝜃𝜃9    0.060249** 
𝜃𝜃10    0.050125** 
𝜃𝜃11    0.045088** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.00064* -0.00061* -0.000649* -0.000837*** 
𝛼𝛼1 0.0000742 -0.001461 0.000141 0.000677 
𝛼𝛼2 -0.000115 -0.001151 -0.000703 -0.000593** 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.003783 -0.136785 -0.080555 -0.022377 
𝛼𝛼4 0.492122*** 0.475844** 0.386797* 0.446652*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.574103*** 0.999398*** 0.992939*** 0.745687*** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.00064* -0.00061* -0.000649* -0.000837*** 
𝛿𝛿2 0.000917* 0.001061** 0.000961** 0.000722 
𝛿𝛿3 0.001276 0.001172 0.001267 0.000139 
𝛿𝛿4 0.004744*** 0.004147*** 0.004419*** 0.004444*** 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00000111*** 0.00000118*** 0.00000118*** 0.00000164*** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.0000197** 0.0000191** 0.0000189** 0.0000137** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.517728*** 0.514437*** 0.513712*** 0.507513*** 














Table 4.14. Results from Oxen Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) Terms 
Coef 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  0.025277 -0.033908 -0.028276 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.0000689 -0.016027 
𝜃𝜃2    -0.011939 
𝜃𝜃3    0.005243 
𝜃𝜃4    0.003833 
𝜃𝜃5    -0.000179 
𝜃𝜃6    -0.00759 
𝜃𝜃7    -0.002081 
𝜃𝜃8    -0.013636 
𝜃𝜃9    -0.010544 
𝜃𝜃10    -0.027639 
𝜃𝜃11    -0.011753 
𝛿𝛿1 0.0000479 0.0000524 0.0000557 0.000208 
𝛼𝛼1 0.000874 0.004486 -0.000944 0.001563 
𝛼𝛼2 0.000099 -0.000619 0.0000833 0.000448 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.036827*** 0.016011 0.250649 0.135839 
𝛼𝛼4 0.427495*** 0.173254 -0.133716 -0.010799 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.437014*** 0.99788*** 1.031923*** 1.021729*** 
𝛿𝛿1 0.0000479 0.0000524 0.0000557 0.000208 
𝛿𝛿2 0.001804*** 0.0018*** 0.001759*** 0.001851*** 
𝛿𝛿3 -0.002199*** -0.002208*** -0.002217*** -0.002516*** 
𝛿𝛿4 0.000849 0.000853 0.001053 -0.000818 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00000348*** 0.00000346*** 0.00000322*** 0.00000559*** 
𝛿𝛿6 -0.0000152*** -0.0000152*** -0.000016*** -0.0000076 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.683773*** 0.683737*** 0.690659*** 0.706557*** 
Statistical Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  
The results show: statistically significant market power parameters for the steers 
in all monthly dummies. Cows and heifers show a negative relation between price and 
quantity in the demand equation and also in the supply equation, which could be related 
with the inverse relation that the female animals have in the stock, also non statistically 
significant coefficients, which also could be related with the same. The oxen show positive 
relation price quantity in both equations, but also non significant. The steers by the other 
side, show negative relation for the price and quantity in demand equation, but positive 
for the supply equations, so is an expected result, which is also statistically  significant for 




The parameters of the prices of wage and energy show negative and non 
statistically significant values. Respect to the wholesale price of beef, all shows positive 
and significant values.  
All the animals show positive supply response to the price of the fertilizer (𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎), 
but the heifers and oxen have negative values for the price of corn (𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛), both could be 
related with the production system and the food supplementation through corn, which 
could be critical in intensive systems for heifers, which make sense based on the milk 
industry.  
The price of milk shows positive response in the female animal which is not 
expected, but could be explained because the prices of milk will not determine the 
sacrifices of female cattle.  
Finally all animals show positive response from the 12 months lagged cattle 
supply, and most of the times statistically significant. So in general terms the sex separate 
models allow us to identify more characteristics of this industry which is the expected for 
a disaggregated model. 
 The most important finding is in the monthly dummy model Table 4.10, the steer 
model shows all of the conjectural elasticity parameters with statistically significant 
coefficients, which could be a clear indicator of market power in the steer market. This 
market power issue does not appears in the female cattle (heifers or cows) because is an 
investment to keep them in the herd for the milk and to keep the production. Also there 
is significant result for the case of the oxen (table 7d) but this is a marginal case, because 




farmers, for example from the diary sector, have the steers like disposal material from 
the milk production system, so they can try to get rid of these animals when they are 
young or if they choose to keep them they can just use cheap extensive systems based on 
pastures, so not expecting a better price. Maybe this strategy could be used by the 
farmers who fat the animals, low cost production, that also allows expanding the period 
to sell. By the other hand the expected demand for this model shows an AR(1) coefficient 
close to one, indicating serial correlation of the errors, which is negative for the model. 
Anyway this results do not show evidence of market power from this market, because the 
monthly market power (constant parameter plus monthly dummy) do not show 
statistically significant results.   
 The AR(1) for the case of the demand function shows values closed to one in the 
constant and variable conjectural elasticity model. The AR(1) for the supply function are 













Table 4.15. Cows Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) and AR(2) Terms 
Coef 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 
Monthly 
Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  -0.53721 -0.536977 0.076594 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.00000559 0.005115 
𝜃𝜃2    0.011226 
𝜃𝜃3    -0.001539 
𝜃𝜃4    0.001083 
𝜃𝜃5    -0.004549 
𝜃𝜃6    0.005083 
𝜃𝜃7    0.017031 
𝜃𝜃8    0.025458 
𝜃𝜃9    0.032869 
𝜃𝜃10    0.021454 
𝜃𝜃11    0.00951 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.000112 0.003585 0.003582 -0.000529 
𝛼𝛼2 -0.000101 -0.00034 -0.000334 -0.000576 
𝛼𝛼3 0.006082 0.068884 0.06946 -0.049619 
𝛼𝛼4 0.415673*** 0.617972 0.615695 0.175237 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.615375*** 1.422447** 1.423092** 1.002295** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) -0.099272 -0.532147 -0.532341 -0.003479 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.000085 -0.0000813 -0.0000813 -0.0000785 
𝛿𝛿2 0.000416*** 0.000415*** 0.000415*** 0.000393*** 
𝛿𝛿3 0.000228 0.000204 0.000204 0.000137 
𝛿𝛿4 0.000126 0.000103 0.000103 -0.000148 
𝛿𝛿5 0.000000413*** 0.000000429*** 0.000000429*** 0.000000582*** 
𝛿𝛿6 -0.00000115 -0.00000118 -0.00000118 -0.000000849 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.427292*** 0.423153*** 0.423139*** 0.388816*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) 0.335841*** 0.33522*** 0.335236*** 0.351044*** 












Table 4.16. Heifers Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) and AR(2) Terms 
Coef 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  0.006213 0.054369 0.132153 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.000109 0.015985 
𝜃𝜃2    0.025074 
𝜃𝜃3    0.010548 
𝜃𝜃4    0.020374 
𝜃𝜃5    0.01569 
𝜃𝜃6    0.040449 
𝜃𝜃7    0.060842 
𝜃𝜃8    0.076251 
𝜃𝜃9    0.094598 
𝜃𝜃10    0.057773 
𝜃𝜃11    0.030743 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.00088*** -0.001277 -0.001844 0.0000384 
𝛼𝛼2 0.000856*** 0.000393 0.000456 -0.000856 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.021154 -0.029595 -0.029931 -0.03605 
𝛼𝛼4 0.237585*** 0.263264** 0.269024** 0.408383 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.589308*** 0.391898 0.395983 1.045531 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) 0.252177*** 0.605091 0.602453 -0.083662 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.000124 -0.000113 -0.000114 -0.000115 
𝛿𝛿2 0.000388** 0.000398** 0.000403** 0.000404** 
𝛿𝛿3 0.000185 0.00013 0.000134 -0.000083 
𝛿𝛿4 0.000312 0.000457 0.000453 0.000404 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00000134*** 0.00000126*** 0.00000126*** 0.00000144*** 
𝛿𝛿6 -0.000000562 -0.00000166 -0.00000166 -0.00000247 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.398736*** 0.383873*** 0.383963*** 0.367719*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) 0.284057*** 0.29729*** 0.297331*** 0.312253*** 













Table 4.17. Steers Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) and AR(2) Terms 
Coef 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  0.036261 0.019855 0.031322 
𝜃𝜃1   0.0000263 -0.02152 
𝜃𝜃2    -0.016029 
𝜃𝜃3    0.006237 
𝜃𝜃4    0.005659 
𝜃𝜃5    0.001704 
𝜃𝜃6    -0.004695 
𝜃𝜃7    0.002489 
𝜃𝜃8    -0.008058 
𝜃𝜃9    -0.005528 
𝜃𝜃10    -0.029736 
𝜃𝜃11    -0.016676 
𝛼𝛼1 0.001058* 0.010322 0.008779 0.004248 
𝛼𝛼2 0.00019* -0.000241 0.000122 0.000968 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.033958*** 0.031406 0.049005 0.142935 
𝛼𝛼4 0.369249*** 0.515869 0.176416 0.038322 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.385905*** 1.29365*** 1.39119*** 1.419164*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) 0.161887** -0.39646 -0.484212 -0.415258 
𝛿𝛿1 0.00000356 0.0000219 0.0000209 0.000201 
𝛿𝛿2 0.001791*** 0.001786*** 0.001765*** 0.001864*** 
𝛿𝛿3 -0.002098*** -0.002104*** -0.002098*** -0.002424*** 
𝛿𝛿4 0.000887 0.000854 0.001099 -0.000768 
𝛿𝛿5 0.0000036*** 0.00000355*** 0.00000317*** 0.00000534*** 
𝛿𝛿6 -0.0000151*** -0.0000151*** -0.0000161*** -0.00000788 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.735359*** 0.73133*** 0.742477*** 0.682083*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) -0.078429 -0.073661 -0.088592 0.018053 













Table 4.18. Oxen Model for the Chilean Cattle Market with AR(1) and AR(2) Terms 
Coef Constant 𝜃𝜃 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑇𝑇 𝜃𝜃 = 0 Monthly Dummy 
𝜃𝜃0  0.715902 0.079555 1.235205 
𝜃𝜃1   0.002321 0.032523 
𝜃𝜃2    0.065794 
𝜃𝜃3    0.034809 
𝜃𝜃4    0.067951 
𝜃𝜃5    0.054805 
𝜃𝜃6    0.074675 
𝜃𝜃7    0.06948 
𝜃𝜃8    0.067704 
𝜃𝜃9    0.051915 
𝜃𝜃10    0.05646 
𝜃𝜃11    0.061333 
𝛼𝛼1 0.0000416 -0.002058 -0.000949 -0.002674 
𝛼𝛼2 -0.0000759 0.00069 -0.000485 0.004128 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.0028 -0.200299 -0.028486 -0.122575 
𝛼𝛼4 0.492051*** 0.607172 0.404718 1.057155* 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.622723*** 1.83391*** 1.947331* 1.939838*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) -0.060767 -0.844289 -0.94702 -0.939672*** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.000812*** -0.000811*** -0.000812*** -0.000878*** 
𝛿𝛿2 0.000853* 0.000848 0.000855* 0.000883* 
𝛿𝛿3 0.001513 0.001546 0.001516 0.000562 
𝛿𝛿4 0.004708*** 0.004633*** 0.00464*** 0.004315*** 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00000129*** 0.0000013*** 0.0000013*** 0.0000016*** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.0000169* 0.0000169* 0.0000168* 0.000013* 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.465702*** 0.464856*** 0.464917*** 0.46556*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(2) 0.097658 0.099979 0.099697 0.076826 
Statistical Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  
The results with the AR(1)AR(2) model do not show major difference than the 
AR(1) model, the most notable difference is that the steers model do not show any more 
statistically significant conjectural elasticities, and of course the values for the coefficient 
of the AR(1) value, change mostly in the inverse demand equation with values greater 





4.5.1 Additional Hypothesis Testing for Steers Market Power 
Because I find conjectural elasticity parameters significant for the steers in the 
AR(1) model, I calculate the total monthly conjectural elasticity: which is equal to the 
constant value plus the monthly value, this give us the results in the Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Conjectural Elasticity Values though the Months of a Year 
 
 
Now looking at the significance of the sum of the individual coefficients, I try the 
Wald test and a t-test (Table 4.16), finding mostly statistically significant values for the 
case in which I multiply the dummy variable by the number times the month appears in 































Table 4.19. Significance of the Sum of Coefficients to Determine Conjectural Elasticity  
Model p-value T-test 
C(1) +C(13)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(14)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(15)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(16)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(17)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(18)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(19)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(20)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(21)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(22)=0 No significant No significant 
C(1) +C(23)=0 No significant No significant 
 
Also I check with the Wald test (Table 4.17) if all the monthly coefficients have an 
effect together, but the result cannot reject the null hypothesis that this coefficient have 
an effect together, so then I tried with some of the coefficients that are related with 
periods of the year when the steers are ready to sell (from July), and in that case I find 
statistically significant values for periods of three months following July (July, august, 
September or august, September, October), but if I move more to the end the year and 
beginning of the next year (September, October, November or October, November, 
January) I do not find any statistical significance. I also test for month not related in time 
(i.e. January, May, October) and the result was not significant. These results make sense 
because if the steers complete their cycle at the end of July, the steers are ready to be 
sold after the fattening period, so the farmers want to sell the animals in order to recover 
the money and avoid more cost. If the farmers just fat animals will be in disadvantage, for 




beef per animal is lower and also the costs are higher because the efficiency of conversion 
is lower. And the most of the cattle is sold in those first months after the end of the cycle. 
 
Table 4.20. Wald Test Chi-Squared p-values for AR(1) Monthly Dummy Model  
Test H0 p-value 
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙 = 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 = 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 = 0 0.0532 
𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 = 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 = 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 0 0.0556 
𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 = 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0 0.1182 
𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 0 0.1127 
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 0 0.1103 
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢 = 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 = 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 = 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙 = 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 = 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 = 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 0 0.6692 
 
 
4.6 Results Analysis 
In all the regression models I cannot find any evidence of market power in the Chilean 
Cattle Market, however this could be explained mainly by two reasons: special features 
of the Chilean Cattle Market and the nature of market power estimation. 
Firstly the Chilean Cattle Market, like I said before, is different from other countries` 
cattle markets, these differences can be summarized in: 
1) Beef producers are poor and low qualified 
2) Beef is a byproduct of milk production 
3) Types of production: central intensive, and south extensive 
4) Geographical and Market Concentration of Beef Packing 
5) Beef Law (1993) and increasing demand for beef 




So based on this is expected to not find any market power evidence, because first 
of all the main cattle supply to slaughterhouses is cattle from the milk industry, so is an 
industry based on byproducts, where the milk farmers try to sell the males and old 
females, as a secondary way to earn money, which could give them some market power 
to sell or at least do not care to much about the selling price. Also the concentration of 
slaughterhouses because of Beef Law, is mixed with the increasing role of supermarkets 
in the industry and the dramatically increase in imports, consequently the supermarkets 
and imports compensate the concentration in slaughterhouses.  
 Secondly, looking at the results from other authors looking market power in a 
country with a developed cattle industry, like United States, they also in some cases do 
not find any significant market power evidence, or none. First of all Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999), which is the main paper for this research, do not find evidence in market power 
for the U.S. Cattle Market. The rest of the analyzed paper have different findings: 
Schroeter (1988) and Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) find little evidence of buyers` market 
power (1% and 1.1% respectively), however Schroeter (1988) concludes that in spite of 
increased concentration in this industry the market power remains constant. Similar is 
the case of Azzam and Park (1993), who find different values for 𝜃𝜃 for three periods: 1960-
1977 (𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 = 0.0093) which is extremely low and shows no evidence of oligopsony; 1978-
1982 (𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 = 0.031); and 1982-1987 (𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣 = 0.016). So the last two periods show little 
evidence of market power, however as the same as Schroeter (1988), they said that the 




in that period of time the concentration increases; consequently an increase in 
concentration could be related with a decrease in market power.  
Finally there is an important detail to add, the buyers` market power value is 
determined by conjectural hypothesis (𝜃𝜃), but also for the elasticity of cattle supply (𝜖𝜖); 
so market power from the buyer: 𝑀𝑀 = 𝜃𝜃
𝜖𝜖
. In this case I never found statistically different 
from zero values for 𝜃𝜃, so market power always is zero for this research; however for 
some cases could be that you can find small values of 𝜃𝜃, but also small values for 𝜖𝜖, and 









CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Conclusion 
The beef market in Chile, is characterized by a demand for live animals consists 
mainly of slaughtering companies which are concentrated near the big cities of the 
country, and that since the mid-nineties have start to decline, thus increasing market 
concentration. The supply of cattle is given by producers who are mainly from the south 
of Chile. There is a decline in animal production, compared to previous years, despite the 
increasing demand for meat, which has been partly satisfied by increased imports and 
sacrifice of belly, which does not guarantee future maintain stable production. The 
decrease is due among other things to the low yield per hectare of business because of 
their higher production costs and low prices paid.  
 The aggregate model shows coefficients with non-expected values, but then in the 
sex separate model I find details about some of those results. Anyway still there are issues 




The conjectural elasticities values are statistically significant equal to zero in 
almost all the models, the only exception is the steer monthly dummy model where I find 
significant values for the market power parameter for all the months, this could suggest 
that market power is exercised on the market for steers and also depends on the 
seasonality. As I know the steers in Chile represents a sub product of the milk farms so is 
the type of bovine with more movement in the market and also the biggest in number. 
However the results show that there is no statistically significant monthly market power, 
so the market has no market power from the firms.  
 The results are explained because the characteristic of the Chilean Cattle market, 
especially that the cattle for beef is a byproduct of the diary industry, the increasing role 
of the supermarkets in the industry and the dramatically increase of beef imports. Also 
the results are supported based on results of similar studies, but applied to the United 
States Cattle Industry, like Muth and Wohlgenant (1999), Schroeter (1988) and Azzam and 
Park (1993). 
5.2 Final Recommendations 
I do not find market power, however the Chilean Beef-Cattle Industry is 
decreasing in importance against the imports, so in order to support the producers 
there are some recommendations for the farmers: 
 
5.2.1 Increase Technical-Marketing Knowledge to Farmers 
Like I talk before the Chilean cattle producers, specially the smaller ones, have a 




improve that knowledge the efficiency will increase and the production costs will 
decrease so they will be better off to confront a market power situation. 
Technically speaking the producers need to know how to select the fittest cattle 
breed for the edaphoclimatic conditions and also for the available resources. For that case 
Hereford breed is one of the best options for Chilean production based on its hardiness. 
Also the farmers need to learn how to control the animal productive cycle in order to 
produce animals in the shortest time and at the smallest cost, this is linked with the 
correct grassland management which is determinant to decrease the cost of food.  
Also the farmers need advice to know which part of the productive process fits better 
with them: first stage birth, breeding first stages (calves), breeding final stages (heifers or 
steer), or the whole process. Most of the times the farmers assume the whole process 
instead of focusing in one so the take most of the time and costs making the process 
inefficient. Also the farmers must decide among beef, milk or mixed production, and 
complementary productions, like a silvopastoral system. Even in some cases the cattle 
production could be non profitable and the producers must produce something more 
appropriate to their conditions. 
Finally the producers must learn how to use the tools and money given by the 
government and also how to use the available information about prices, for example, in 





5.2.2 Increase Technology Transfer   
Very related with the previous point, the government spends money in research 
and development for the beef sector, but the way to transfer this knowledge must 
improve and also the information must be processed for a better understanding from 
them, or just the more educated farmers will take advantage of it. 
 
5.2.3 Promote Association between Producers 
Like I express before the association, especially between small farmers, is an 
affordable way to establish an opposite force to the sellers and get better prices but also 
buy inputs at lower prices, at least among farmers located geographically close. Also could 
be very convenient to share facilities if they want to process and export beef by 
themselves.   
 
5.2.4 Explore New Markets: like Export High Quality Beef 
A nice option to the producers could be to explore new markets in high income 
segments in the country or abroad, producing more valuable breeds like: the intense 
marbling Wagyu, the soft meat Angus, or the leaner meat Limousin; or also another types 
of production like organic. The main problem with this is that is easier in some way to 
make it if you sell your own product, more than sell the animal, so the producers needs 
to integrate vertically the process in order to process the animal and get the beef. Also 
another problem is to get the certification if they want to export the beef to developed 




the animal, the processing sector needs to consolidate beef exports, which are very 
limited in the country. Could be that the government promotes this kind of exports and 
make with the beef the same than with the fresh fruit, wine and salmon, taking advantage 
of Chile´s multiple free trade agreements. 
 
5.2.5 Use of Contracts 
Just like I mentioned before, the use of contracts for animal sell could help the 
producers giving them some guaranties about the amount of money earned every season, 
also ensuring a minimum selling quantity, a stable amount of money, and avoiding 
imperfect competition effects. Moreover with the use of contracts the producers will 
need to get a minimal quality, improving their production, generating feedback between 
firms and producers. Also the contracts could be between firms and groups of farmers, 
which could be very positive in a sense that together they need to reach a volume, so 
everyone can produce whatever they can. Anyway in order to reach this requires a joint 
effort between firms, farmers and government, which is critical because needs to give the 
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Appendix A Instrumental Variables Correlations 
Table A.1. Instrumental Variables Correlation with LHS and RHS Variables for Aggregate 
Model 
   Instruments 







 D 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8 
S 
𝑄𝑄 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 









𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎  1.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 0.0 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙  -0.7 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.5 
S 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 -0.2 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  -0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢  -0.5 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.3 
𝑡𝑡 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 0.3 0.7 1.0 
 
 
Table A.2. Instrumental Variables Correlation with LHS and RHS Variables for Cow Model 
   Instruments 







 D 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.5 -0.5 0.6 0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 
S 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤  0.2 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.1 0.5 0.2 0.4 -0.4 -0.3 









𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎  1.0 -0.7 0.6 0.7 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙  -0.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 0.0 
S 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 -0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 -0.4 1.0 0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢  0.8 -0.5 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.3 






Table A.3. Instrumental Variables Correlation with LHS and RHS Variables for Heifer 
Model 
   Instruments 







 D 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 -0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 
S 
𝑄𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  -0.2 0.6 0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 









𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎  1.0 -0.7 0.6 0.7 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 -0.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 0.0 
S 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 -0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 -0.4 1.0 0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢  0.8 -0.5 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.3 
𝑡𝑡 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.6 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.3 0.7 1.0 
 
 
Table A.4. Instrumental Variables Correlation with LHS and RHS Variables for Oxen 
Model 
   Instruments 







 D 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥  -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.4 -0.4 0.4 0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 
S 
𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥  -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.6 0.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 









𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎  1.0 -0.7 0.6 0.7 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 -0.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 0.0 
S 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 -0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 -0.4 1.0 0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢  0.8 -0.5 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.3 


















Table A.5. Instrumental Variables Correlation with LHS and RHS Variables for Steer 
Model 
   Instruments 







 D 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.5 -0.5 0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.9 
S 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 









𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎  1.0 -0.7 0.6 0.7 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙  -0.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 0.0 
S 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 -0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 -0.4 1.0 0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢  0.8 -0.5 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.3 
























Appendix B Additional Tests for the models 
Table B.1. Jarque-Bera Normality Test Results 
Model Equation 
p-value 
M&W Cow Heifer Ox Steer 
zeroar1ar2 
Inv. Dem 0.2780 0.8854 0.7407 0.0000*** 0.3223 
Supply 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Joint 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
constar1ar2 
Inv. Dem 0.0000*** 0.0012*** 0.7420 0.0000*** 0.0694* 
Supply 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Joint 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
varar1ar2 
Inv. Dem 0.0000*** 0.0013*** 0.9164 0.0000*** 0.7182 
Supply 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Joint 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
dumar1ar2 
Inv. Dem 0.0764* 0.7796 0.4275 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Supply 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Joint 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
zeroar1 
Inv. Dem 0.0993* 0.3132 0.5002 0.0000*** 0.3513 
Supply 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Joint 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
constar1 
Inv. Dem 0.0000*** 0.9352 0.0034*** 0.0000*** 0.5207 
Supply 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Joint 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
varar1 
Inv. Dem 0.0342** 0.5742 0.0047*** 0.0000*** 0.3928 
Supply 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Joint 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
dumar1 
Inv. Dem 0.0055*** 0.7178 0.3047 0.0000*** 0.8679 
Supply 0.6359 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0024*** 0.0000*** 
Joint 0.0232** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Statistical Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10% for rejecting Null Hypothesis of normality of 













Appendix C Model Results with OLS and 2SLS 
Table C.1. OLS and 2SLS Results from the M&W Model for the Chilean Cattle Market 
with AR(1) Terms 
 OLS 2SLS 











𝜃𝜃0  0.00 0.03 -0.01  -0.14 0.40 0.01 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.00 -0.00   -0.00 0.00 
𝜃𝜃2    0.01    0.00 
𝜃𝜃3    0.00    0.00 
𝜃𝜃4    0.00    0.00 
𝜃𝜃5    0.00    0.00 
𝜃𝜃6    0.01*    0.00 
𝜃𝜃7    0.02**    0.01 
𝜃𝜃8    0.04**    0.01 
𝜃𝜃9    0.03**    0.01 
𝜃𝜃10    0.02**    0.00 
𝜃𝜃11    0.01    0.00 
𝛿𝛿1  -0.05 -0.05 -0.16**  0.09 0.09 -0.03 
𝛼𝛼1 0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
𝛼𝛼2 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03** 
𝛼𝛼4 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.44*** 0.32** 0.35** 0.32*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.86*** 0.99*** 0.67*** 0.91*** 0.56*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.61*** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.16** 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.03 
𝛿𝛿2 0.23* 0.22* 0.22* 4.40*** 0.25* 0.25* 0.25 4.79*** 
𝛿𝛿3 0.94*** 0.94** 0.94*** 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 
𝛿𝛿4 1.39*** 1.38*** 1.38*** 1.13*** 0.89** 0.89** 0.89* 1.17*** 
𝛿𝛿5 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.27** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 











Table C.2. Weighted OLS and 2SLS Results from the Cow Model for the Chilean Cattle 
Market with AR(1) Terms 
 Weighted OLS Weighted 2SLS 











𝜃𝜃0  -0.09 -0.10 -0.10*  0.05 0.21 0.03 
𝜃𝜃1   0.00 0.00   -0.00 0.00 
𝜃𝜃2    0.01    0.00 
𝜃𝜃3    0.00    -0.00 
𝜃𝜃4    0.00    0.00 
𝜃𝜃5    -0.00    -0.00 
𝜃𝜃6    0.01*    0.00 
𝜃𝜃7    0.03**    0.01 
𝜃𝜃8    0.05***    0.01 
𝜃𝜃9    0.05***    0.02 
𝜃𝜃10    0.03***    0.01 
𝜃𝜃11    0.01**    0.00 
𝛿𝛿1  -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛼𝛼2 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛼𝛼3 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 
𝛼𝛼4 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.42*** 0.27 0.20 0.18 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.87*** 0.89*** 0.99*** 0.92*** 0.55*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 0.99*** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛿𝛿2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝛿𝛿4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.60*** 













Table C.3. Weighted OLS and 2SLS Results for Heifer Model for the Chilean Cattle Market 
with AR(1) Terms 
 Weighted OLS Weighted 2SLS 











𝜃𝜃0  0.00 0.04 0.00  0.12 0.15 -0.07 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.00 -0.00   -0.00 0.00 
𝜃𝜃2    0.00    0.01 
𝜃𝜃3    0.00    0.00 
𝜃𝜃4    0.00    0.01 
𝜃𝜃5    0.00    0.01 
𝜃𝜃6    0.00    0.03 
𝜃𝜃7    0.01    0.05 
𝜃𝜃8    0.02    0.07 
𝜃𝜃9    0.02    0.09 
𝜃𝜃10    0.00    0.06 
𝜃𝜃11    0.00    0.03 
𝛿𝛿1  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛼𝛼1 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
-
0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
𝛼𝛼2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.01* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02** -0.09 -0.09 0.00 
𝛼𝛼4 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.29 0.29 0.19 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.67*** 0.80*** 0.61*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 0.97*** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛿𝛿2 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛿𝛿4 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.48*** 













Table C.4. Weighted OLS and 2SLS Results for Ox Model for the Chilean Cattle Market 
with AR(1) Terms 
 Weighted OLS Weighted 2SLS 











𝜃𝜃0  0.03 -0.04 0.07  0.02 -0.09 0.10 
𝜃𝜃1   0.00** -0.02*   0.00 -0.01 
𝜃𝜃2    -0.02    -0.00 
𝜃𝜃3    -0.00    0.00 
𝜃𝜃4    -0.00    0.00 
𝜃𝜃5    -0.01    -0.00 
𝜃𝜃6    -0.03*    -0.01 
𝜃𝜃7    -0.01    -0.00 
𝜃𝜃8    -0.02    -0.02 
𝜃𝜃9    -0.00    -0.01 
𝜃𝜃10    -0.02    -0.03 
𝜃𝜃11    -0.00    -0.01 
𝛿𝛿1  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝛼𝛼1 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
𝛼𝛼2 0.00*** 0.000* 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.02*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.07 0.02 
𝛼𝛼4 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.17 0.06 -0.02 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.42*** 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 0.97*** 
𝛿𝛿1 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝛿𝛿2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿3 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 













Table C.5. Weighted OLS and 2SLS Results for Steer Model for the Chilean Cattle Market 
with AR(1) Terms 
 Weighted OLS Weighted 2SLS 











𝜃𝜃0  0.00 0.08 -0.01  0.61 -0.28 -0.22 
𝜃𝜃1   -0.00** -0.00   0.00 0.03* 
𝜃𝜃2    0.01**    0.04** 
𝜃𝜃3    0.00    0.02* 
𝜃𝜃4    0.01*    0.06** 
𝜃𝜃5    0.01*    0.04** 
𝜃𝜃6    0.02***    0.06** 
𝜃𝜃7    0.02***    0.06** 
𝜃𝜃8    0.03***    0.06** 
𝜃𝜃9    0.03***    0.06** 
𝜃𝜃10    0.02***    0.04** 
𝜃𝜃11    0.00*    0.04* 
𝛿𝛿1  -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***  -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** 
𝛼𝛼1 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
𝛼𝛼2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
𝛼𝛼3 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.14 -0.08 -0.00 
𝛼𝛼4 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.30*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.39* 0.42*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.68*** 0.90*** 0.58*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.87*** 
𝛿𝛿1 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿2 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
𝛿𝛿3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝛿𝛿4 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.0*** 
𝛿𝛿5 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
𝛿𝛿6 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 
Statistical Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  
 
 
 
 
